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SUMMARY
We consider a problem of coding for covert communication, which involves ensuring
reliable communication between two legitimate parties while simultaneously guarantee-
ing a low probability of detection by an eavesdropper. Specifically, we develop an opti-
mal low-complexity coding scheme that achieves the information-theoretic limits of covert
communication over binary-input discrete memoryless channels. We first demonstrate the
non-triviality of designing codes for covert communication by showing the impossibility
of achieving information-theoretic limits using linear codes without a shared secret key
for a regime in which information theory proves the possibility of covert communication
without a secret key. We then circumvent this impossibility by introducing non-linearity
into the coding scheme through the use of pulse position modulation (PPM) and multilevel
coding (MLC). This MLC-PPM scheme exhibits several appealing properties; in particular,
for an appropriate decoder, the channel at a given level is independent of the total number
of levels and the codeword length. We exploit these properties to show how one can use
families of channel capacity- and channel resolvability-achieving codes to concretely in-
stantiate a covert communication scheme. Further, we extend the MLC-PPM scheme using
bi-orthogonal PPM symbols to achieve information-theoretic limits of covert communica-
tion over additive white Gaussian channels. Finally, we illustrate the application of this




The history of secure communication is that of a perpetual contest between codemakers
and codebreakers, in which codemakers develop coding schemes with increasing complex-
ity only to have them broken by codebreakers with unexpected consequences. For instance,
during the First World War, the British cryptanalysts were successful in breaking the se-
cret diplomatic communication from the German foreign office, popularly known as the
Zimmermann telegram, that proposed a military alliance between Germany and Mexico,
encouraging direct aggression against the United States. As a result of this, Woodrow Wil-
son, then president of the United States, decided to join the Allied forces in the war against
Germany, which eventually impacted the outcome of the war. Although the encryption
schemes that we use today are much more secure than the ones used by the German foreign
office, their security is based on the computational complexity of inverting certain math-
ematical operations. The security of those schemes heavily depends on proving that the
computational time required to solve the inverse problem using state-of-the-art computing
resources is very high that it is virtually impossible. However, there already exist effi-
cient quantum algorithms that can solve these computationally hard problems much faster.
Consequently, the emergence of quantum computers might result in a scenario similar to
the breaking of the Zimmermann telegraph. This motivates us to investigate information-
theoretically secure communication schemes, which ensure the security of a coding scheme
without assuming any limitation on the computational capability of the adversary. Recently,
there have been many advances in this area. We will briefly review some of these advances
in the next chapter.
Although secure communication protects the message from being decrypted by the ad-
versary, it does not protect users from revealing to the adversary that they are communicat-
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ing. In scenarios such as covert military operations, even the presence of communication
arouses suspicion to a watchful adversary. In such situations, encryption is not sufficient
and it is important to use techniques with low probability of detection (LPD) to exchange
strategic information. This type of communication with LPD is also known as covert com-
munication or deniable communication and has attracted renewed interest in information
theory. Although there exist many studies that address the information-theoretic limits of
various covert communication scenarios, only a handful of studies have addressed the con-
struction of practical codes for covert communication. Even the ones that have proposed
code designs have not provided any explicit optimal construction that achieves the limits
predicted by information theory. We address this by developing a low-complexity coding
scheme for covert communication using multilevel coding with pulse-position modulation.
Our scheme achieves the covert capacity of discrete memoryless channels (DMCs) and
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels. The rest of the thesis is organized as
follows.
• In Chapter 2, we introduce the covert communication problem and the background
required for this study. We also survey results in information-theoretic security that
are relevant to covert communication.
• In Chapter 3, we introduce a coding scheme for covert communication over BI-DMCs
using multilevel coding (MLC) and pulse-position modulation (PPM). We discuss
the information-theoretic analysis of the scheme and prove that this scheme is opti-
mal for covert communication.
• In Chapter 4, we discuss the design of practical codes for covert communication
over BI-DMCs using MLC and PPM, and we provide an explicit low-complexity
code construction using polar codes and invertible extractors.
• In Chapter 5, we extend the MLC-PPM code construction to covert communication
over AWGN channels by proving the optimality of bi-orthogonal PPM as a signaling
2
scheme for AWGN channels.
• In Chapter 6, we demonstrate the application of MLC-PPM for covert forward rec-
onciliation, which is an important step in covert secret-key generation.




In this chapter, we introduce the covert communication problem and review the related
literature. The objective of covert communication is to establish communication between
legitimate users while avoiding detection by an adversary. This is similar to the steganog-
raphy discussed in [1], where a hidden message is embedded in an innocent message called
covertext to get a seemingly innocent message called stegotext. In covert communication,
we model the absence of communication by sending of “innocent symbols” by Alice and
the presence of communication by sending of codewords which contain a mix of innocent
symbols and non-innocent symbols. In steganography terms, the innocent symbols are the
covertext and the codewords are the stegotext. The main difference between covert com-
munication and steganography is that in covert communication, Bob and Willie observe
Alice’s codeword through a noisy channel whereas, in steganography, Bob and Willie have
direct access to Alice’s stegotext.
Covert communication also has some connections with spread-spectrum communica-
tion. Spread-spectrum communication techniques guarantee a low probability of intercep-
tion and anti-jamming properties [2]. Interestingly, the development of spread-spectrum
communication dates back to the Second World War, a war waged with jamming and anti-
jamming tactics [2]. In spread-spectrum communication, instead of restricting a signal to
a minimum bandwidth required by the signaling scheme, it is sent over a frequency band
of a much larger order of magnitude either by frequency hopping techniques or spreading
the signal using a pseudorandom spreading sequence. Although practical spread spectrum
communication techniques are well established, there is no information-theoretic guaran-
tee that it is not undetectable. Information-theoretically provable communication with low
probability of detection (LPD) was first studied by Bash et. al. in [3]. We will devote
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the rest of this chapter to introduce the notations and definitions and review the literature
related to covert communication.
2.1 Notation
We denote random variables by uppercase letters, e.g., X , their realizations by lowercase,
e.g., x, and vectors of random variables and their realizations by their corresponding bold-
face letters, e.g., X and x, respectively. We denote a discrete memoryless channel with
input X ∈ X and output Y ∈ Y with a transition probability distribution WY |X by DMC
(X ,WY |X ,Y). Given two distributions P and Q defined on the same alphabet X , V(P,Q)








and D(P‖Q) denotes the Kullback–Leibler(KL) divergence or the relative entropy between








Note that log denotes the natural logarithm and log2 denotes logarithm to the base 2.

















Let X ∈ X and Y ∈ Y be two discrete random variables with joint distribution PXY .
Let PX be the marginal distribution of X and PY |X be the conditional distribution of Y





The joint entropy of X and Y is defined as





PXY (x, y) logPXY (x, y). (2.6)
The conditional entropy of X given Y is defined as





PXY (x, y) logPY |X(y|x). (2.7)
If X is a continuous random variable, the differential entropy is used instead of entropy





The joint and conditional differential entropies are also defined similarly. The mutual in-
formation between X and Y is defined as
I(X;Y ) , D(PXY ‖PXPY ). (2.9)
For the discrete case, we have I(X;Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y |X), and for
the continuous case, we have I(X;Y ) = h(X)−h(X|Y ) = h(Y )−h(Y |X). Because we
use natural logarithm to compute above quantities, we use nat as the unit of information.
For two real-valued functions f(n) and g(n) of n ∈ N, we write f(n) = o(g(n)) if for
all α > 0, there exists n0 ∈ N∗ such that for all n > n0, |f(n)| 6 α|g(n)|; f(n) = O(g(n))
6
if there exist α > 0 and n0 ∈ N∗ such that for all n > n0, |f(n)| 6 α|g(n)|; f(n) =
ω(g(n)) if for all α > 0, there exists n0 ∈ N∗ such that for all n > n0, |f(n)| > α|g(n)|.
2.2 Secret communication
A communication system is said to ensure secrecy (also known as confidentiality) if the
legitimate users of the system can communicate with each other without revealing the con-
tent of their message to an adversary. In the layered communication systems that we use
today, secrecy is achieved using encryption schemes (such as RSA and AES) in the higher
layers of the protocol stack. However, these encryption schemes are only secure because
the computational workload required to decrypt the message without the key is assumed to
be beyond what is feasible with today’s technology. In contrast, information-theoretically
secure communication provides secrecy even if the adversary has infinite computational
resources.
2.2.1 Shannon’s cryptosystem
Shannon’s cryptosystem model [4], illustrated in Fig. 2.1, initiated the information-theoretic
analysis of secrecy. In this model, Alice encrypts a message W into a ciphertext X using
a key S shared between Alice and Bob. Bob decodes the message from the ciphertext X














Figure 2.1: Shannon’s cryptosystem.
7
cess to this ciphertext X. Shannon introduced the notion of equivocation to measure the
eavesdropper’s uncertainty about the message asH(W |X).A system is said to have perfect
secrecy if Ŵ = W and H(W ) = H(W |X), or equivalently I(W ; X) = 0. The quantity
I(W ; X) can be interpreted as the amount of information leaked to the eavesdropper. The
condition I(W ; X) = 0 implies that perfect secrecy is achieved if W and X are statisti-
cally independent. Unfortunately, perfect secrecy is only achievable with a one-time-pad
and requires as many key bits as message bits.
2.2.2 Wiretap channel
In 1975, Wyner [5] introduced the wiretap channel, which is now the standard model to
study information-theoretic secrecy over noisy channels. Unlike Shannon’s model, the
wiretap channel assumes that the communication channel is noisy. This assumption al-
lows one to circumvent the rather disappointing result regarding Shannon’s cryptosystem.
The wiretap channel model, as illustrated in Fig. 2.2, consists again of legitimate users
Alice and Bob, and an eavesdropper Eve. Alice first encodes her message W to a code-
word X of length n using a coding scheme Cn and transmits the codeword over the DMC
(X ,WY |X ,Y) to Bob. Eve observes this communication over the DMC (X ,WZ|X ,Z).
Note that Alice and Bob do not have access to a shared secret key. Bob’s and Eve’s obser-
vations are denoted by Y and Z, respectively, and the output of Bob’s decoder is denoted



















Figure 2.2: The wiretap channel model.
8
ability condition for the coding scheme Cn is expressed in terms of average probability of





Ŵ 6= W |Cn
)
= 0.
Rather than enforcing perfect secrecy, the secrecy condition consists in requiring almost
perfect secrecy. In the literature, there exists a variety of metrics to quantify what “almost”
means. We discuss two types of secrecy metrics for which secrecy is measured in terms
of the number of bits leaked to the adversary denoted by I(W ; Z). In weak secrecy, the






I(W ; Z|Cn) = 0.
In strong secrecy, the leakage is measured using the unnormalized mutual information, and
the requirement is given by
lim
n→∞
I(W ; Z|Cn) = 0.
The maximum rate at which Alice can communicate with Bob while satisfying the relia-
bility and secrecy requirements is called the secrecy capacity, denoted by CS . The secrecy
capacity is the same for weak and strong secrecy [6], and it is given by
CS = max
V−X−Y Z
[I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)]. (2.10)
The notation V −X − Y Z means that V,X, Y, and Z form a Markov chain such that the
joint distribution is pV XY Z = pV pX|VWY Z|X , and the maximization is taken over all joint
distribution satisfying the Markov chain.
2.3 Covert communication
In its simplest form, the problem of covert communication (or communication with LPD),



























Figure 2.3: Covert communication model.
a message to Bob over a BI-DMC represented by DMC (X ,WY |X ,Y) while avoiding the
detection of the communication by the warden Willie, who observes the communication
through DMC (X ,WZ|X ,Z). By convention, channel input “0” is the innocent symbol
corresponding to the absence of communication. For j ∈ {0, 1} we set Pj , WY |X=j and
Qj , WZ|X=j . Alice encodes her messages W ∈ J1,MK into codewords X of n binary
symbols, which are observed by Bob and Willie as Y and Z, respectively. Alice’s encoding
may be assisted by private randomness S ∈ J1, KK shared only with Bob. Bob forms an
estimate Ŵ of the transmitted message using Y and S.
The objective of Alice is two-fold: 1) to communicate the message W to Bob with
negligible probability of error and 2) to avoid detection by Willie. In this model, Willie
knows the communication scheme used by Alice and Bob, and the only unknowns are
the actual message transmitted and the realization of the channel noise. The probability




, where Ŵ is Bob’s estimate of
the message W . From the perspective of Willie, the detection of communication involves
choosing between two hypotheses – the hypothesis that Alice is not transmitting, denoted
by H0, and the hypothesis that Alice is transmitting, denoted by H1. The performance of a
hypothesis testing is characterized by the false alarm probability α, which is the probability
that the detector outputs H1 when H0 is true, and missed detection probability β, which is
the probability that the detector outputs H0 when H1 is true. Let Q̂n be the distributions
induced when H1 is true and Q⊗n0 be the “innocent distribution” induced when H0 is true.
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Willie’s objective is to minimize both α and β. However, α and β are correlated, and
one cannot optimize them independently. The curve obtained by plotting α against 1 − β,
known as ROC curve, captures this correlation. The worst performance of the detector
corresponds to a blind test and Willie can achieve any α ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [0, 1] such that
α + β = 1 using a blind test. The ROC curve corresponding to this is depicted in Fig. 2.4.
From [7, Theorem 13.1.1], we have that the ROC curve for an optimal hypothesis test
is characterized by






























, and hence, we obtain











to be very small, we can
enforce the performance of Willie’s detector to be no better than a blind test. In Fig. 2.4,






, and the right side of the dashed










to be small, this
dashed line moves closer to the line representing a blind test.









= 0, does not ensure secrecy. It only ensures that the
distribution induced in the presence of communication is close to the one in the absence
11



















Figure 2.4: ROC curve for Willie’s detector.
of communication. However, secrecy condition, I(W ; Z|Cn) → 0 as n → ∞, requires the
independence between the inputW and the adversary’s observation Z, which is not implied
from the covertness condition.
2.3.1 Previous works on covert communication
While practical covert communication techniques have been studied by the spread-spectrum
community, the information-theoretic limits of covert communication were first studied by
Bash et al. in [3]. In that work, the authors laid the foundations for the study of covert
communication by discovering the square-root limit on the amount of information that can
be transmitted reliably with LPD over AWGN channels. The authors analyzed a commu-
nication setup in which Alice transmits a real-valued symbol represented by the random
variable X , and Bob and Willie observe the outputs of two AWGN channels represented
by Y = X+Nb and Z = X+Nw, respectively, where Nb and Nw are zero-mean Gaussian
noise with variances σ2b and σ
2
w. The achievability proof of covert communication over this
channel uses a random coding argument in which codewords are generated independently
and identically according to the distribution pX(x) =
∏n
i=1 pX(xi), where X ∼ N (0, Pf ).
The codebook is used for the transmission of a single message and is a secret shared be-
tween Alice and Bob; however, Willie knows how the codebook is generated. In the ab-
12
sence of transmission of codewords, the distribution at the output of Willie’s channel is
Q⊗n0 , where Q0 = N (0, σ2w). Since Willie does not know the codebook, the distribution
induced at the output of Willie’s channel by the transmission of a codeword is Q⊗n1 , where





, the covertness condition can be satisfied by choosing f(n) = σ̂2w if Alice
knows σw is lower bounded by σ̂w and f(n) such that f(n) = o(1) and f(n) = ω(1/
√
n)
if σw is unknown to Alice. Further, the authors showed that Alice can reliably transmit,
while satisfying the condition for covertness V(Q⊗n0 , Q⊗n1 ) 6 ε for any ε > 0, o(
√
n) bits
to Bob over n channel uses when σw is unknown to Alice and O(
√
n) bits over n channel
uses if a lower bound σw > σ̂w for some σ̂w > 0 is known to her. Moreover, the authors
showed that if Alice attempts to transmit ω(
√
n) bits over n channel uses, either Willie can
detect the communication using a power detector or Bob cannot decode the codeword with
an arbitrarily low probability of error.
Subsequently, Che et al. [9] extended the result to BSCs by establishing the square root
limit without the need for any shared secret keys when the channels are BSCs and Willie’s
observations are significantly noisier than Bob’s. Bloch [10] generalized the results to all
DMCs and AWGN channels showing that communication with LPD is possible without
secret key as long as the legitimate receiver’s channel is “better” than the warden’s channel
in the sense that D(P1‖P0) > D(Q1‖Q0). In [11], Bash et al. showed that selecting a
single n-symbol-period slot tA out of T (n) slots, as depicted in Fig. 2.5, using log T (n)
pre-shared secret bits allows Alice to reliably transmit O(
√
n log T (n)) bits on an AWGN
channel to Bob with LPD for Willie’s detector.
Covert communication also relates to the problem of stealth, introduced by Hou and
Slot 1 Slot tA
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Figure 2.5: Slotted covert transmission.
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Kramer [12]. Hou and Kramer combined secrecy and covertness by defining a security
measure called “effective security” that includes strong secrecy and stealth communication
as
D(PMZ‖PMQZ) = I(M ; Z) + D(PZ‖QZ), (2.14)
where M is the message with distribution PM , Z is the adversary’s observation with dis-
tribution PZ and joint distribution PMZ, and QZ is the distribution that the warden ex-
pects to observe when the transmitter is not communicating useful messages. Ensuring
D(PMZ‖PMQZ)→ 0 as n→∞ implies the coding scheme satisfies the secrecy condition
I(M ; Z) → 0 and the stealth condition D(PZ‖QZ) → 0. A subtle distinction of covert
communication is that QZ = Q⊗n0 , a distribution induced by a deterministic input. In [13],
Che et al. discussed a reliable, deniable, and hidable communication scheme over a BSC.
Che et al. showed that the effective secrecy, which constitutes deniability (covertness) and
hidability (secrecy), could be achieved by encoding for each separately. In [14], Kadhe et
al. analyzed a reliable, deniable, and hidable communication over a multipath network con-
sisting of multiple parallel links in the presence of a passive warden Willie, who observes
an unknown subset of links. The authors also characterized the capacity for reliable and
deniable communication for that network. A survey of various security measures related to
covert communication can be found in [15].
The square root limit on the number of bits transmitted implies that covert communi-
cation is only possible at zero rate. To obtain a meaningful asymptotic constant, Wang et
al. [16] characterized the asymptotic constant obtained by normalizing the number of bits
transmitted with
√




6 δ. This quantity is now known as the
covert capacity in the literature and will be precisely defined in Section 2.3.2. Bloch [17]
provided a complete characterization of the covert capacity with the amount of secret key
required and determined the condition under which keyless covert communication is pos-
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sible. Later, Tahmasbi and Bloch [18] analyzed covertness using three different metrics
– the relative entropy and the variational distance between the induced output distribution
and innocent distribution and the probability of missed detection for a fixed probability of
false alarm. For each metric, the authors characterized the exact first-order asymptotics
of the number of bits that can be transmitted for a given maximum probability of error
and covertness metric. The authors also characterized the exact second-order asymptotics
for relative entropy and derived bounds for the other two metrics. Meanwhile, Arumugam
et al. extended the information-theoretic analysis of covert communication to multiple-
access channels (MACs) [19, 20], broadcast channels [21, 22], and relay channels [23].
Moreover, the idea of covertness has been extended to covert secret key generation in [24]
and the quantum regime in [25, 26, 27, 28, 29].
Several studies have investigated the possibility of circumventing the square-root law
by incorporating the warden’s uncertainty about the channel noise parameters. In one
study [30], the authors analyzed a covert communication setting in which the channels
are BSCs with the probability of bit-flipping distributed uniformly in a known interval and
Willie’s channel is noisier than Bob’s channel and showed that positive-rate covert com-
munication is possible in that case. In another study, Lee et al. [31] analyzed undetectable
communication over AWGN and Rayleigh channels when the warden employs a radiometer
detector and has uncertainty about his noise variance. The authors showed that positive-rate
covert communication is possible in that scenario. The same problem was extended in [32]
to multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) Rayleigh fading channels. Further in [33], the
authors analyzed the effect of sampling of Willie’s observations. In another study, Sobers
et. al. [34] analyzed a covert communication scenario in the presence of a friendly jammer
that does not know the content or timing of Alice’s transmission and showed that a power
detector is optimal for Willie when Alice uses a random Gaussian codebook. Applying
that result, the authors showed that Alice can communicate O(n) covert bits to Bob in n
channel uses. In our research, we will be mainly concerned with situations in which the
15
square root law cannot be circumvented.
2.3.2 Covert capacity
In our covert communication model in Fig. 2.3, the message W is selected from the set
J1,MK and the key S is selected from the set J1, KK. Hence, logM represents the number
of nats of message transmitted and logK represents the number of nats of key used for
the transmission. As mentioned in the previous section, the scaling of the number of bits
transmitted in n channel uses follows square root law. Hence, the rate of communication
in the usual sense of the number of bits transmitted per channel use is zero. From the
characterization of the constant behind the
√
n in [16] for the maximum number of bits




6 δ for δ > 0 and the
probability of error goes to zero, Wang et. al. noticed that a constant that depends only on
the channel properties can be obtained by normalizing the number of bits transmitted by
√
nδ. Using that characterization, we define covert capacity as follows.
As explained previously, we shall measure the reliability of Bob’s decoder using the









. We say that a coding scheme achieves covert throughput R with a























for some chosen δ > 0. The supremum of all achievable covert throughputs is called the







In [18], the authors refined the previous result and analyzed the first- and second-order
asymptotics of the maximum number of bits that can be transmitted over a DMC by con-
sidering three covertness metrics. The reliability and covertness conditions the authors
considered for covert communication are that the maximum probability of error should be
upper bounded by ε and the covertness metric should be upper bounded by δ. When the




















4 +O(log n), (2.16)














2 dx. Note that we obtain the covert capacity in (2.15) from
the above equation by taking limε→0 limn→∞ logM√nδ .




6 δ, the authors obtained the exact first
















. The authors also obtained bounds for the asymptotic of the second
order term.





for a given probability of false alarm α, the authors obtained the


















where Λ , Q−1(1 − α − δ) and Υ , Q−1(α). The authors also obtained bounds for the
second-order asymptotic.
In this work, we consider relative entropy as the covertness metric. For this case, the
minimum covert key throughput needed to achieve the covert capacity is denoted by RoptK .





(D(Q1‖Q0)− D(P1‖P0))+ , (2.19)
where (x)+ , max(x, 0). In this work, we design codes that achieve this optimal through-
puts over DMCs and AWGN channels using multilevel coding (MLC) and pulse-position
modulation (PPM) with multistage decoding (MSD).
2.4 Achieving covertness with resolvability codes
Resolvability codes are used to approximate the output distribution of a channel by em-
ploying a codebook at the input of the channel. Han and Verdú [35] defined the notion
of resolvability of a channel as “the number of random bits per input sample required to
achieve arbitrarily accurate approximation of the output statistics regardless of the actual
input process.” For a DMC (X ,WY |X ,Y), let PX denote the input distribution and PY





Let X denote an input sequence of length n and Y denote the corresponding output.
Let P ⊗nX and P
⊗n
Y denote the product distributions for n uses of the channel. Let Cn =
{xi}i∈J1,2nRK denote a code with each codeword of length n. Let P̂Y denote the output
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W ⊗nY |X(y|xi). (2.21)





= 0. The minimum of all achievable resolution rate is called the
resolvability of the channel. Han and Verdú [35] showed that the resolvability is equal to
the Shannon capacity I(X;Y ).
The importance of resolvability based code construction for achieving secrecy was
shown in [36], where the objective was to control the distribution at the eavesdroppers chan-
nel output such that the observations would be independent of the message transmitted. In
covert communication, the objective is to induce a distribution PZ at the warden’s chan-
nel output such that it is indistinguishable from the innocent distribution Q⊗n0 . Bloch [17]
proposed achievability schemes for covert communication using resolvability in two steps.
First, distribution Q⊗nαn induced when the input of the channel is biased such that the proba-
bility of symbol 1 is αn , ωn√n with ωn = o(1)∩ ω(1/
√
n) is shown to be indistinguishable




= 0. Then, resolvability based coding schemes are
used to simulate the distribution Q⊗nαn .
Note, however, that the approach in [17] is still information-theoretic in nature and
does not offer explicit low-complexity algorithms. Few studies have explored the explicit
construction of codes for resolvability. In one study [37], the authors presented a polar
coding based code for resolvability of symmetric BI-DMC as the basis for a construction
of code for strong coordination. Subsequently, Chou et al. generalized the method for
any BI-DMCs for construction of codes for empirical and strong coordination [38] and
broadcast channel with confidential messages [39]. In another work [40], Chou et al. pre-
sented a construction of low-complexity channel resolvability codes for symmetric MAC
using invertible extractors and injective group homomorphisms. Bloch et al. presented a
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comprehensive overview of coding schemes for secrecy with approaches based on channel
resolvability, channel reliability, and source coding in [6].
2.5 Codes for covert communication
Although there is a significant amount of literature on the information-theoretic analysis of
covert communication, few researchers have addressed the construction of practical low-
complexity codes. In [41], the authors analyzed a concatenated code construction with an
inner random code and an outer Reed-Solomon code and showed the existence of low-
complexity coding schemes for covert communication over a BSC, but their work did not
provide an explicit code construction of the inner code. In another study [42] that we will
review later, the authors proposed an explicit code construction for asynchronous covert
communication [43] over BI-DMCs using polar codes, which involves hiding the trans-
mission in a larger window using a shared secret key. In [44], the authors showed the
optimality of PPM for covert communication by presenting an achievability proof using a
random non-binary code over PPM symbols. In our work, we build upon this construction
to achieve a low-complexity coding scheme that achieves the covert capacity for BI-DMCs.
We will review the main results on PPM based construction in the next section.
2.5.1 Polar codes for covert communications over asynchronous discrete memoryless
channels
In [42], the authors introduced an explicit code for covert communication over binary-input
asynchronous discrete memoryless channels using binary polar codes. This code construc-
tion is based on the coding scheme for asynchronous covert communication using random
codes proposed in [43]. The coding scheme for asynchronous covert communication is as
follows. The sender encodes an uniformly distributed message W ∈ J1,MnK into a code-
word of length n, possibly with the help of secret key S ∈ J1, KnK only known to Alice
and Bob. The codebook is public and known to all parties. The scheme is called “asyn-
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chronous” because the codeword is embedded within a larger transmission window of size
N > n by choosing the starting index T of the codeword uniformly at random between 1
and N ′ , N − n + 1, where N is a function of n. We refer to the part of the transmission
window where the codeword is transmitted as the codeword window. Let X1:N represent
the sequence transmitted during the transmission window and Y1:N and Z1:N represent the













Figure 2.6: Illustration of transmission window for asynchronous covert communication.
duced at the output of Willie’s channel by the codeword window. The distribution induced
at the output of Willie’s channel by a transmission window with codeword window starting











Then, the distribution induced at Willie’s channel by randomizing the start index of code-






Bob estimates the messageW from the observation Y1:n and the secret key S. The estimated





Ŵ 6= W |S
)]
. The covertness of the transmission is measured by the total variation






. The main result of [43] regarding the existence of codes for asynchronous
covert communication is given by the following proposition.
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Proposition 1. [42, Proposition 1] Consider sequences of positive numbers {αn}n∈N∗ ,










, there exist sequences of codes of block length n hidden in transmission windows










6 [D(Q1‖Q0)− D(P1‖P0)]+ (2.25)
lim
n→∞
P (n)e = 0 (2.26)
lim
n→∞
V (n) = 0. (2.27)
The proof of the above proposition uses a random coding argument [43]. The work
in [42] establishes a similar result using polar codes in place of random codes by a slight
modification of the above coding scheme by considering bn consecutive transmission win-
dows of size N . The probability of error P (n)e for Bob’s decoder is modified to reflect the
set of messages in bn transmission windows {Wi}bni=1 as





and the covertness is measured by the total variation between the distribution induced over
bn transmission windows given by





The results of [42] is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. [42, Proposition 2] There exists a constant κ ∈]0, 1
2
[ such that for all






)and sequence of integers {bn}n∈D ∈ ω(log n) ∩ o( 1βn ) ∩ o(n) as n goes to infin-
ity, there exist low-complexity polar-code based schemes operating over bn transmission
windows of size N = 2
nα2n
βnα2n










6 [D(Q1‖Q0)− D(P1‖P0)]+ (2.31)
lim
n→∞
P (n)e = 0 (2.32)
lim
n→∞
V (n) = 0. (2.33)
The constant κ arises from the analysis of fine polarization of vanishing entropy rate
sources [42, Proposition 3] and the authors noted that κ takes values of the order of 10−3.
This means that the range of values αn takes is limited and it cannot achieve the scaling of
1√
n
required to achieve the scaling of Proposition 1.
2.5.2 PPM for covert communication
A PPM symbol of order m is a vector of length m with symbol 0 at m − 1 positions and
symbol 1 at one position. Let x̃i denote the vector with symbol 1 at i-th component as
shown in Fig. 2.7, and let X̃m = {x̃i}i∈J1,mK denote the set of all possible PPM symbols of
order m. Let Z̃ = (Z1, Z2, . . . , Zm) denote the output of the channel DMC (X ,WZ|X ,Z)
corresponding to a vector input of length m. Also, let QmPPM be the output distribution
induced by an input uniformly distributed on X̃m over a DMC (X ,WZ|X ,Z) and Q⊗m0
be the output distribution induced by an all-zero input. For a realization of output of the
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Figure 2.7: Illustration of PPM symbol x̃i.
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The optimality of PPM for covert communication over BI-DMCs follows from the
sparse nature of PPM symbols. Because of the sparse structure of PPM symbols, we can
bound on the relative entropy between the two distributions QmPPM and Q
⊗m
0 as follows.
































for any integer k > 1.





terms stemming from an error in the calculation. However, it does not
affect the other results in [44], and we have corrected that error in the present lemma.
Lemma 1 shows that the two distributions can be made indistinguishable by scaling the
order m of the PPM symbols. Let X̃ denote the random variable uniformly distributed in
X̃m. Let Ỹ denote the random variable representing the output of the channel (X ,WY |X ,Y)
corresponding to the input X̃ .










The above lemma suggests that it is possible to transmit close to D(P1‖P0) bits in m
uses of the channel (X ,WY |X ,Y) by coding over many PPM symbols. In [44], the authors
showed the optimality of PPM for covert communication using a random coding scheme
over PPM symbols by appropriately scaling the order of the PPM symbols proportionally
to the codeword length, which is summarized by the following lemma.
Proposition 3. [44, Proposition 1] For any ξ, δ > 0, there exists a sequence ofm-ary codes




































where Q̂n is the output distribution induced by the coding scheme.
Note that the results in [44] show the existence of codes using random coding argu-
ment. In our work, we propose an explicit low-complexity scheme using MLC over PPM
symbols.
2.6 Binary linear codes cannot achieve the covert capacity of BI-DMCs without
shared secret
We now consider the model described in Section 2.3 with Bob’s channel represented by
BI-DMC (X ,WY |X ,Y) and Willie’s channel represented by BI-DMC (X ,WZ|X ,Z), where
X , {0, 1} and 0 is the innocent symbol for covert communication corresponding to the
absence of transmission. According to the results in [17], covert communication is possi-
ble without any secret key shared between Alice and Bob if D(P1‖P0) > D(Q1‖Q0). Our
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objective is to show that, under this assumption, covert communication with binary lin-
ear codes is not possible without shared secret key because such communication is easily
detected; in particular, we show that no binary linear code can achieve the covert capacity.
A small misconception One might think that linear codes might not be covert because
the linearity constraint requires the sum of codewords to be a codeword; consequently,
linear combinations of low-weight codewords would result in a codeword with high weight.
This is, however, insufficient to argue that linear codes cannot be covert. In fact, one
could consider a systematic code with unit-weight codewords in the generator matrix, i.e,
G = ( Ik 0k×n−k ), where Ik is the identity matrix of size k. All codewords of this code
have weight at most k. Of course, this code would hardly be covert, mainly because the
structure of the generator matrix allows an attacker to dismiss the last n − k codeword
components. The next proposition formalizes this.
Proposition 4. Consider an (n, k) binary linear code with (n, k) ∈ (N∗)2, n > k. Assume
that the code is used for communication over a BI-DMC (X ,WZ|X ,Z) with uniformly
distributed messages. There exists a binary hypothesis test with false alarm probability α
and missed-detection probability β such that
















Proof. Let G ∈ Fk×n2 be a generator matrix of the code, with columns {gi}ni=1 ∈ Fk2.
Denote the set of 2k codewords by C , {c`}2k`=1. Let m be the number of non all-zero
columns in G, and denote the corresponding column indices {ij}mj=1. Note that k 6 m
by definition of the dimension of the code. The observations of the adversary in the m
positions {ij}mj=1 constitute a sufficient statistics for the detection of communication, and
the optimal test is a log-likelihood ratio test restricted to the m positions. We consider a
26
suboptimal test that only operates on a subset of indices S ⊂ {ij}mj=1 that indexes all the
distinct columns of G. Since the matrix G is binary, this implies that the columns {gi}i∈S
are pairwise linearly independent and |S| > k. Given an observation z = (z1, . . . , zn) at









We now show that there exists a test on this statistic that satisfy the conditions in the propo-
sition. We use Markov’s inequality to show this. Towards this end, we first compute the
mean and variance of T (Z) in the absence and the presence of communication.
In the absence of communication, we have for any j ∈ S that Zj ∼ Q0, and therefore














































For any j ∈ S, we have Zj ∼ 12Q0 + 12Q1 by [45, Problem 3.25]. Consider now j, ` ∈ S,
j 6= ` and define Nab = |{c = (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ C : cj = a, c` = b}| for a, b ∈ {0, 1}. By


























































































































































Therefore, combining (2.47) and (2.49), we obtain


























Finally, to simplify the analysis, we choose a convenient threshold γ = 1
4
χ2(Q1‖Q0).
For the test T (z) defined in (2.36) together with the threshold γ, the probability of false
alarm α satisfies








β = PQ̂n(T (Z) < γ) = PQ̂n(−T (Z) > −γ) (2.54)
= PQ̂n
(
























− 4|S| . (2.58)
The result follows by recalling that |S| > k and β > 0.
As a corollary of Proposition 4, we have the following.
Corollary 1. A family of (n, kn) binary linear codes with (kn, n) ∈ (N∗)2 and kn 6 n,
for which kn = ω(1) as n goes to infinity cannot achieve covert capacity for a BI-DMC
without using shared secret key. In particular, linear codes cannot achieve any fraction of
the covert capacity in this case.
Proof. Consider a family of (n, kn) codes with kn = ω(1), i.e., limn→∞ kn = ∞. By










as n goes to
infinity and the communication is detected with nonzero probability for n large enough.
The result follows since achieving covert capacity would require kn = θ
√





and some θ > 0 [16].
30
CHAPTER 3
MULTILEVEL CODING FOR COVERT COMMUNICATIONS
In this chapter, we introduce our coding scheme for covert communication using multi-
level coding with multistage decoding and provide an information-theoretic analysis of the
scheme. As mentioned in the previous chapter, most of the research on covert commu-
nication has focused on the information-theoretic analysis, which proves the existence of
codes using random coding argument. There has been little attention paid to the design
of codes for covert communication with an explicit construction that can be implemented
in practice. In this chapter, we propose a coding scheme that achieves the covert capacity
for BI-DMCs with a focus on practical implementation. One of the important points to
note while designing codes for covert communication is that the codeword weights should
be of the order of
√
n. There is a conjecture that this requirement may not be achieved
using a binary linear coding without introducing any non-linearity to the scheme. In fact,
we know from Section 2.6 that it is impossible to achieve covert capacity using a binary
linear code without any secret key shared between the legitimate users. In theory, a shared
secret is not required when the Willie’s channel is degraded with respect to (w.r.t.) Bob’s
channel. However, even for this degraded case, linear codes cannot be optimal for covert
communication.
Motivated by this negative result, we have developed a non-linear scheme in which
the non-linearity is introduced through PPM. The results in [44] show that PPM achieves
the covert capacity when combined with suitable random non-binary codes. One subtlety
behind the results in [44] is that the PPM order (and therefore the non-binary field size)









making it hard to realize such codes in practice with low-complexity. Reed-Solomon (RS)
codes offer the desired scaling (they are q-ary code of length q − 1), but not the flexibility
needed to meet the requirement in (3.1). To circumvent the design of non-binary codes, we
use MLC to decompose the PPM super-channel into q ∈ N∗ binary-input channels.
3.1 Notation
In this section, we introduce the main notations that we use in this chapter and subsequent
ones. Let Ja, bK be the set of integers between bac and dbe. When used as a subscript
or a superscript, we denote Ja, bK by a:b. As we use PPM extensively in this chapter, we
recall the definition of PPM symbol and define the related notations. For q ∈ N, m = 2q,
and i ∈ J1,mK, we define a PPM symbol x̃i of order m as the binary vector of length
m such that the i-th component is one and all other components are zero. The use of
PPM modulation over the channel BI-DMC (X ,WY |X ,Y) defines a “super channel” with
transition probability W̃Ỹ |X̃ , W
⊗m
Y |X , whose input alphabet is the set of all PPM symbols
of order m denoted by X̃q = {x̃i}mi=1 and whose output alphabet is Ỹq = Y2
q . For any set
S ⊆ J1, qK and a sequence of random variables X1, . . . , Xq, we denote the set of random
variables (Xi)i∈S by XS . Using this notation, we have X1:q = (X1, . . . , Xq). For a binary
sequence x1:q ∈ Fq2, we let d(x1:q) ∈ N denote the decimal equivalent of x1:q defined as




Let d−1(·) denote the inverse operation of d(·), that is, d−1(d(x1:q)) = x1:q. For j ∈ J1, qK,
we call d−1(j) the binary equivalent of j. Note that the operation d−1(·) is specific to the
value of q even though it is not explicitly evident in the notation. Let Aq(xS) denote the
elements of J1, 2qK that agree in their binary equivalent with x1:q in positions S; that is, for
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any set S ⊆ J1, qK and x1:q ∈ Fq2, we define
Aq(xS) ,
{
j ∈ J1, 2qK : (d−1(j))S = xS
}
, (3.2)
where (d−1(·))S denotes the components of d−1(·) indexed by the elements of S. The
complement of the set Aq(xS) w.r.t. J1, 2qK is denoted by Aq(xS)c , J1, 2qK\Aq(xS). For
example, let q = 4, x1:q = 1011, and S = {2, 3}, then Aq(xS) = {5, 6, 13, 14}.
We define a PPM mapper as a one-to-one mapping from the set of all binary vectors of
length q to the set of all PPM symbols of order 2q denoted by
x̃ : Fq2 → X̃q : x1:q 7→ x̃(x1:q) = x̃Aq(x1:q) = x̃d(x1:q), (3.3)
Hence, we denote the PPM super channel equivalently in terms of the binary vector input as
W̃Ỹ |X̃ ≡ W̃Ỹ |X1:q . We use both notations interchangeably depending on the situation. For
the channel W̃Ỹ |X̃ , the distribution at the output by a uniformly distributed PPM symbols












Recall from Section 2.3 that we use BI-DMC (X ,WY |X ,Y) as the main channel or Bob’s
channel and BI-DMC (X ,WZ|X ,Z) as the warden’s channel or Willie’s channel. The dis-
tribution induced at the output of Willie’s channel by a uniformly distributed PPM symbols
is denoted by QmPPM(ỹ) and is defined similar to (3.4) with WZ|X instead of WY |X .
3.2 Setup for MLC with PPM
Alice divides her uniform message W into q independent and uniformly distributed mes-
sages (W1, . . . ,Wq) where Wi represents the input message to the i-th level, which we will
precisely define later. The setup is illustrated in Fig. 3.1, in which q binary encoders feed
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their codeword outputs to a PPM symbol mapper of order m , 2q. In the i-th level, the
encoder encodes message Wi into a binary vector Xi ∈ F`2 of length `. The PPM mapper
takes these coded binary vectors from each level in parallel and maps the binary vector of
length q entering the mapper to a PPM symbol; we thus obtain a vector of PPM symbols,
X̃ ∈ X̃ `q at the output of the PPM mapper. Bob and Willie observe the outputs of chan-
nels W̃Ỹ |X̃ and W̃Z̃|X̃ denoted by Ỹ ∈ Ỹ`q and Z̃ ∈ Z̃`q , respectively. Let Q⊗m`0 denote the
innocent distribution induced when only innocent symbol “0” is sent through the channel
WZ|X over m` channel uses, and PZ̃ denote the distribution induced at Willie’s receiver by
coding over ` super-channel uses. Before analyzing the coding scheme further, it is worth
noting that the benefits of MLC are not a priori obvious. In fact, since the number of levels
changes with the order of the PPM symbol m and the blocklength `, which are related by
(3.1), one could expect that the channels perceived at each level i ∈ J1, qK would vary as
the blocklength grows, making code design challenging. Perhaps surprisingly, we show in
Chapter 4 that this is not the case and that codes may be designed for fixed channels; this is
particularly convenient as it allows us to exploit families of channel capacity- and channel

































Figure 3.1: Setup for MLC over PPM super channel.
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3.3 Information-theoretic analysis of MLC
We now present the information-theoretic analysis of MLC and show using a random cod-
ing argument that there exist binary coding schemes with MLC that achieve the covert
capacity of BI-DMCs. From [17, Theorem 2], we know that we need a key to achieve
covertness only when D(P1||P0) < D(Q1||Q0). However, in MLC, we are coding over
multiple levels and the channel corresponding to individual levels may not preserve the
same relation. Consequently, irrespective of the relationship between the original chan-
nels, we might need keys for some levels, whereas we might be able to send some covert
and secret messages over some other levels depending on the mutual information relations
between the two channels corresponding to that particular level. We can overcome this by
using chaining, which consists of breaking the transmission into several blocks and using
the secret messages from one block as the keys for the next block. By using chaining, we
only require extra keys for the first block, and on average the throughputs of messages and
keys tend to the optimal throughputs as the number of blocks tends to infinity. We prove this
by first characterizing the size of keys and messages for a single block and then developing
a chaining strategy that achieves optimal throughput and covertness over B blocks.
We first describe the coding scheme for a single block. Let Wi = (Ui, Vi) with Ui ∈
J1,MU,iK and Vi ∈ J1,MV,iK be a random variable that represents the message for the i-
th level and Ki ∈ J1,MK,iK be the key shared between Alice and Bob. Vi represents the
secret part of the message, which is reused as a key for the next block. Ui, Vi, and Ki are
independent and uniformly distributed random variables. Let RU,i , logMU,i/`, RV,i ,
logMV,i/`, and RK,i , logMK,i/` represent the rates of Ui, Vi, and Ki, respectively.
Encoders for each level are independent; therefore, we can view the MLC scheme in Fig.3.1
as a q-user MAC in which the PPM mapper is integrated to the channel. Because of the
symmetry of the PPM super channel, a uniform distribution on PPM symbols achieves the
capacity for Bob’s channel. Note that, to ensure (3.1) holds, the number of levels q depends
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on the blocklength ` of the code. Hence, we cannot directly use the results for MAC with
a fixed number of users [47]. After careful analysis, we show that the result remains what
would have expected from [47].
The codebook, encoding, and decoding for one block are as follows.
• Codebook: For i-th level, generate a codebook of MU,i ×MV,i ×MK,i codewords,
each of length `, denoted by Xi(ui, vi, ki), where ui ∈ J1,MU,iK, vi ∈ J1,MV,iK, and
ki ∈ J1,MK,iK. Each codeword is generated independently according to a uniform
distribution on X `, denoted by P ⊗`Xi .
• Encoding: Given messages Ui and Vi and key Ki for the i-th level, the i-th encoder
selects the codeword Xi(Ui, Vi, Ki).
• Decoding: The receiver decodes ŵ = (û1, . . . , ûq, v̂1, . . . , v̂q) from ỹ knowing the
key k = (k1, . . . , kq) if ŵ is the unique message such that (X1(û1, v̂1, k1), . . . ,
Xq(ûq, v̂q, kq), ỹ) ∈ T `Γ , where T `Γ is defined as follows. For Γ = {γS}S⊆J1,qK,
T `Γ ,
{





> γS , ∀S ⊆ J1, qK
}
, (3.5)












PỸ |XSc (ỹi|xSc,i) . (3.6)
To simplify the notation, we use the following definitions:
u , (u1, . . . , uq), v , (v1, . . . , vq), w , (u,v),
X1:q(w,k) , X1:q(u,v,k) , (X1(u1, v1, k1), . . . ,Xq(uq, vq, kq)),
X1:q,i(w,k) , X1:q,i(u,v,k) , (X1,i(u1, v1, k1), . . . , Xq,i(uq, vq, kq),
XG(w,k) , (Xi(ui, vi, ki))i∈G, ∀G ⊆ J1, qK; MU ,MU,1 × · · · ×MU,q,
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MV ,MV,1 × · · · ×MV,q, MK ,MK,1 × · · · ×MK,q, M ,MU ×MV .
We first analyze channel reliability and channel resolvability for one block and prove
the existence of a random code that satisfies the requirements for covert communication.
Then, we use chaining over blocks using the same code for each block to obtain a coding
scheme that achieves optimal covert throughputs. For chaining over B blocks, the vari-
ables in the j-th block is identified by a superscript; for example, we denote the message






i ), and the outputs of Bob’s channel and Willie’s channel by
ỹ(j) and z̃(j) respectively.
3.3.1 Reliability analysis
We now analyze the rate requirements for achieving vanishing probability of error using












. The following lemma summarizes the rate requirement.
Lemma 3. For S ⊆ J1, qK and 0 < ε < ε/2, if the rates of random codes satisfy
∑
i∈S





















Proof. See Appendix 3.A.
37
3.3.2 Covertness analysis
We now analyze the channel resolvability of Willie’s channel and prove the existence of
channel resolvability codes if the rates satisfy some condition. Let PZ̃ be the distribution
induced by the code for a given block, QmPPM be the output distribution of Willie’s channel
when the input is uniform over all possible PPM symbols of order m, and Q⊗m`0 be the













































We show using the following lemma that the first two terms go to zero exponentially in `.
Lemma 4. For S ⊆ J1, qK and 0 < ε < ε/2, if the rates of random codes satisfy
∑
i∈S



















2(log 2)2q4 , (3.12)





Proof. See Appendix 3.B.
Lemma 4 actually proves a stronger result than what is required to bound (3.9), as
it guarantees that, on average over all possible values of the message v, the distribution
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induced by coding remains identical regardless of the values of v. This stronger result will
prove useful in Section 3.3.5 when we integrate the code in a chained construction.
3.3.3 Identifying a specific code
Note that Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 are obtained by taking expectation over randomly gen-
erated sequence of codes. We now show that there exists a specific sequence of codes that
satisfies the reliability and covertness conditions. We denote the probability measure w.r.t.
































































By choosing η1 and η2 such that 1η1 +
1
η2
< 1, we have the above probability positive, which


































Since δ2 goes to zero exponentially in `, the first two terms of (3.9) also go to zero expo-















































































3.3.4 MSD operating point for MLC
We know from [44] that the capacity of the PPM super channel converges to D(P1‖P0) as
the PPM order m tends to infinity. Since the PPM mapper is a one-to-one map between
X1:q and the PPM symbol X̃ = x̃(X1:q), we have the following decomposition of mutual
40
information between the input and the output of the PPM super channel W̃Ỹ |X̃ .
I(X̃; Ỹ ) = I(X1:q; Ỹ ) =
q∑
i=1
I(Xi; Ỹ |Xi+1:q). (3.25)
The term I(Xi; Ỹ |Xi+1:q) represents the average mutual information between the input of
the i-th level and Ỹ for a given input to the levels i + 1 to q. Since Xi is independent of
Xi+1:q, we have
I(Xi; Ỹ |Xi+1:q) = I(Xi; Ỹ , Xi+1:q). (3.26)
This suggests that we can consider the i-th level as a channel with input Xi and output
(Ỹ , Xi+1:q) and decode all levels successively in descending order from q to 1 using MSD;
specifically, we decode the q-th level first, then the (q − 1)-th level by treating the decoded
bits from q-th level as a side information for the channel defining (q − 1)-th level, and so
on. From [48], we know that the capacity of the PPM super channel could be achieved
using MSD by choosing the corresponding terms in the summation of (3.25) as the rates
for each level. In our problem, we show that by choosing the rates for i-th level as follows,
we can achieve the optimal rate.
RU,i = min
(










0, I(Xi; Z̃|Xi+1:q)− I(Xi; Ỹ |Xi+1:q) + 2ε/q
)
. (3.29)
The sum in (3.25) converges to D(P1‖P0) as q tends to infinity. This suggests that we can
achieve rates arbitrarily close to D(P1‖P0) by choosing the number of levels in MLC large
enough and rates given in (3.27-3.29) for each level.
We now show that the rates in (3.27-3.29) satisfy the rate requirements in (3.7) and
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−H(Xi|Ỹ , XJi+1,qK∩S , XSc)
)
− |S|ε/q (3.33)
= I(XS , Ỹ |XSc)− |S|ε/q, (3.34)
where (a) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy and the Xi’s are indepen-

















I(Xi; Z̃, {Xj}j∈Ji+1,qK\S |{Xj}j∈Ji+1,qK∩S)









I(Xi; Z̃|{Xj}j∈Ji+1,qK∩S) + |S|ε/q (3.39)
= I(XS ; Z̃) + |S|ε/q, (3.40)
where (a) follows from the independence of {Xi}. This shows that the rates satisfy the
resolvability rate constraints in (3.11).
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We now compute the covert message and key throughputs. The number of bits trans-
mitted is given by


























































0, I(Xi; Z̃|Xi+1:q)− I(Xi; Ỹ |Xi+1:q) + 2ε/q
)
, (3.48)
















We now show using an example that the above key rate is not optimal. Let Bob’s
channel be a BSC with probability of flipping P0(1) = P1(0) = 0.2 and Willie’s channel be
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a binary asymmetric channel (BAC) with probabilities of flippingQ0(1) = 0.1 andQ1(0) =
0.4. The relative entropies for these channels are D(P1‖P0) = 1.2 and D(Q1‖Q0) =
1.083. For this case, ideally, we would not need any key to achieve covert communication;
however, from the computation of I(Xi; Z̃|Xi+1:q) − I(Xi; Ỹ |Xi+1:q) for q = 9 levels
shown in Table 3.1, we can conclude that we need some key bits since I(Xi; Z̃|Xi+1:q) −
I(Xi; Ỹ |Xi+1:q) > 0 for levels 4 to 9.
Table 3.1: I(Xi; Z̃|Xi+1:q)− I(Xi; Ỹ |Xi+1:q) computed in nats for 9 levels.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
-0.0627 -0.0313 -0.0058 0.0054 0.0058 0.0036 0.0019 0.0010 0.0005
Note that I(Xi; Z̃|Xi+1:q) − I(Xi; Ỹ |Xi+1:q) is negative for the first 3 levels. This
suggests that we can send some secret bits over the first 3 levels as RV,i is positive for those
levels. Moreover, the absolute value of the sum of negative terms is greater than the sum of
positive terms. This means that we can generate more keys than we consume. Furthermore,
we can use chaining so that the secret messages from one block can be used as the keys for
the next block.
3.3.5 Chaining over B blocks
We now show that by modifying the coding scheme by chaining over B blocks such that
the secret messages from i-th block {V (i)j }j∈J1,qK are used as the keys for (i + 1)-th block
{K(i+1)j }j∈J1,qK, we can achieve the optimal throughputs. We can aggregate the secret mes-
sages from the levels that support secret messages and distribute them across the levels for
which we need a key. We first show that the probability of error goes to zero asymptotically.
To bound the probability of error forB blocks with chaining, define E (i) = {Ŵ(i) 6= W(i)}
and E (1:B) = ⋃Bi=1 E (i), where W(i) is the transmitted message and Ŵ(i) is the decoded
message at the receiver for the i-th block. Following steps similar to those in the proof of
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This shows that the probability of error goes to zero asymptotically.
We now show that the relative entropy between the induced and innocent distributions
is upper bounded by δ asymptotically. Let PZ̃(1:B) be the distribution induced by the coding













































I(Z̃(j); Z̃(j+1:B)) 6 I(Z̃(j); Z̃(j+1:B),V(j)) (3.55)
= I(Z̃(j); V(j)) + I(Z̃(j); Z̃(j+1:B)|V(j)) (3.56)
(a)
= I(Z̃(j); V(j)), (3.57)
where (a) is because of the Markov chain Z̃(j) → V(j) → Z̃(j+1:B). By steps similar to












6 δ +O( 1
m
). (3.59)
We now show that the covert message and key throughputs are close to the covert ca-
pacity. The number of transmitted bits is given by








Hence, the covert rate is given by
























The number of key bits used is given by




















I(Xi; Z̃|Xi+1:q)− I(Xi; Ỹ |Xi+1:q) + 2ε/q
))+
(3.64)
= `I(X̃; Z̃) + (B − 1)`
(













Therefore, the key throughput is



















and the last term vanishes for largeB. This shows that the covert message and key through-
puts are close to the covert capacity.
3.3.6 Degraded case
We now show that when Willie’s channel is degraded w.r.t. Bob’s channel, we do not require
any chaining or any key. We show that using following proposition.
Proposition 5. The MLC rates
RU,i = I(Xi; Ỹ |Xi+1:q)−
ε
q
, RV,i = 0, RK,i = 0 (3.68)
satisfy both reliability and resolvability constraints when Willie’s channel is degraded w.r.t.
Bob’s channel.









Hence, the rates satisfy the constraints for reliability given in (3.7).




WY |X(y|x)WZ|Y (z|y). (3.70)




















W̃ (ỹ|x̃)W̃ (z̃|ỹ). (3.74)
Hence, the super channel corresponding to Willie’s channel is degraded w.r.t. the super
channel corresponding to Bob’s channel.
The channel corresponding to the i-th level of MLC for Willie’s channel is given by:
































W̃ (z̃|ỹ)WỸ ,Xi+1:q |Xi(ỹ, xi+1:q|xi). (3.78)
This shows that the channels corresponding to each levels of MLC for Willie’s channel are
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degraded w.r.t. those of Bob’s channel. Hence, we have
I(Xi; Ỹ |Xi+1:q) = I(Xi; Ỹ , Xi+1:q) > I(Xi; Z̃,Xi+1:q) = I(Xi; Z̃|Xi+1:q). (3.79)
We choose ε such that I(Xi; Ỹ , Xi+1:q) − ε/q > I(Xi; Z̃,Xi+1:q) + ε/q. Then, for every
































I(Xi; Z̃, {Xj}j∈Ji+1,qK\S |{Xj}j∈Ji+1,qK∩S)

























where (a) follows from the independence of {Xi}. This shows that the MLC rates in (3.68)
satisfy the resolvability rate constraints given in (3.11).
Since we are not using any key, we do not need chaining to achieve optimal rates.







































Figure 3.2: Rate region for MLC with two levels with MSD operating point
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APPENDIX
3.A Proof of Lemma 3






































































































































E [Ai] = I(XS ; Ỹ |XSc). (3.94)













































































P0(y), µ1 = min
y∈supp(P1)
P1(y).
From (3.97) and (3.102), we have





, q log 2
)
. (3.103)
By choosing γS = `
(
I(XS ; Ỹ |XSc)− ε/q
)
and using Hoeffding’s inequality, for large












2(log 2)2q4 . (3.104)
We now analyze the second term in (3.91). For any w 6= 1, we let Gw ⊂ J1, qK denote






















{xj′ (1,kj′ ),xj′ (wj′ ,kj′ )}j′∈Gcw
∏
j′∈Gcw
P ⊗`Xj′ (xj′(1, kj′))P
⊗`
Xj′



















{xj′ (wj′ ,kj′ )}j′∈Gcw
∏
j′∈Gcw

















{xj′ (wj′ ,kj′ )}j′∈Gcw
∏
j′∈Gcw







= e−γGcw , (3.108)






for (xGw(1,k),xGcw(w,k)) ∈ T `Γ and upper bounding the indicator function by 1.
The sum over w 6= 1 in (3.91) can be expressed as the sum over G ⊂ J1, qK by counting






























































































(a) follows from choosing
∑
i∈Gc(RU,i +RV,i) 6 I(XGc ; Ỹ |XG)− ε/q.
(b) follows by upper bounding the number of subsets of J1, qK and by choosing ε > 2ε.
For G ⊂ J1, qK, let i ∈ Gc. Then, we have
I(XGc ; Ỹ |XG) = I(XGc\{i}; Ỹ |XG) + I(Xi; Ỹ |XJ1,qK\{i}) > I(Xi; Ỹ |XJ1,qK\{i}). (3.117)
Because Xi’s are independent and uniformly distributed, the quantity I(Xi; Ỹ |XJ1,qK\{i})
is same for all i. Note that given the realizations of XJ1,qK\{i} = xJ1,qK\{i}, the position of
symbol “1” in the PPM symbol x̃(Xi, xJ1,qK\{i}) is given by one of the two positions indexed
by Aq(xJ1,qK\{i}). Therefore, I(Xi; Ỹ |XJ1,qK\{i}) is equivalent to the mutual information
between the input and outputs when using PPM symbols of order 2 in the MLC-PPM
scheme, and using [44, Eq.(13)], we obtain





where P 2PPM represents the output distribution of Bob’s channel when the input is uniform
over PPM symbols of order 2. Hence, we can find rates satisfying
∑
i∈Gc(RU,i + RV,i) 6
I(XGc ; Ỹ |XG)− ε/q for ε/q < D (P1‖P0)− D (P 2PPM‖P ⊗20 ) for all G ⊂ J1, qK.
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3.B Proof of Lemma 4
We denote QmPPM by QZ̃ and (Q
m
PPM)






































We define a typical set as follows:
T `ε (X1:q, Z̃) ,
{






< I(XS ; Z̃) +
ε
q
, ∀S ⊆ J1, qK
}
. (3.122)
We denote the expectation over all the random variables except X1:q(u,v,k) by E∼X1:q(u,v,k).







































































































































































































(a) follows from Jensen’s inequality.




(u′′,k′′) : (u′′j , k
′′










for all (u′,k′) in that set.




(d) follows because log(1 + xm) 6 mx for x > 0.
(e) follows because
∑
i∈S(RU,i +RK,i) > I(XS ; Z̃) + ε/q.
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Using Hoeffding’s inequality as in the previous section, we can show that
P
(





2(log 2)2q4 . (3.133)













2(log 2)2q4 . (3.134)
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CHAPTER 4
TOWARDS PRACTICAL CODES FOR COVERT COMMUNICATION OVER
BI-DMCs
In this chapter, we discuss the design of practical codes for covert communication over a
BI-DMC using MLC. The code design, in general, involves using keys and chaining over
multiple blocks. To simplify the analysis, we discuss code design for the case in which the
warden’s channel is degraded w.r.t. Bob’s channel. We can generalize the code design for
non-degraded cases using a chaining scheme as explained in the previous chapter. First,
we show that the equivalent channel corresponding to a particular level when using MSD
remains unchanged when we alter the number of levels, which tremendously simplifies the
code design. After establishing additional properties of the equivalent channels, we analyze
the probability of error at Bob’s decoder and covertness at Willie’s receiver. Towards the
end of this chapter, we will discuss an explicit low-complexity code construction using
polar codes and invertible extractors.
4.1 Equivalent channel for each level
We now prove that the channel corresponding to each level of MLC with MSD for uni-
formly distributed inputs can be represented by an equivalent channel that does not depend
on the number of levels used in the scheme. In Section 3.3, we established that we can
consider the i-th channel as a channel with input Xi and output (Ỹ , Xi+1:q). Because of
the structure of PPM, for a known input to the levels i + 1 to q, xi+1:q, the position of the
symbol “1” in the PPM symbol can be narrowed down to 2i positions. Using the notation
defined earlier, Aq(xi+1:q) denotes the set of indices of those positions. According to the
PPM mapper defined in Section 3.1, the position of the symbol “1” is in the first half of the
PPM symbol if xq = 0 and in the second half otherwise. Similarly, if xi = 0, the position
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of the symbol “1” is in the first half of the subset of indices determined by the values of
(xi+1, . . . , xq) and second half otherwise. Table 4.1 shows an illustration of this mapping
for m = 16.
Table 4.1: Illustration of PPM mapper for m = 16
PPM symbol
index
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
x1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
x2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
x3 0 1 0 1
x4 0 1
The set Aq(xi+1:q) also defines the indices for the aforementioned PPM symbols be-
cause of the indexing defined earlier. To estimate the i-th bit, we have to consider only the
outputs at the positions with indices in Aq(xi+1:q). Assuming that the inputs to levels 1 to





























Since the channel is memoryless, once the decoder selects the 2i positions indexed by
Aq(xi+1:q), the distribution of the selected output symbols is independent of the input to
the levels i+ 1 to q. Hence, we can represent the above channel equivalently by




































The crucial aspect of this characterization is showing that this channel remains unchanged
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irrespective of the number of levels q used. Note that the above channel is equivalent to the
i-th channel in an MLC with i levels.
Lemma 5. When using MSD, for i ∈ J1, qK, the bits of the i-th level of MLC-PPM setup
are effectively transmitted over a BI-DMC with transition probability











Moreover, this channel remains unchanged irrespective of the number of levels q used.
Proof. Since, Xi is independent of X i+1:q and the common randomness, we may consider
the i-th level as a channel with input Xi and output (Ỹ , X i+1:q, Ci+1:q). Because of the
structure of PPM, for a known input xi+1:q to the levels i + 1 to q, the position of the
symbol 1 in the PPM symbol can be narrowed down to 2i positions. Let Aq(xi+1:q) denote
the set of indices of those positions. This set also define the indices for the PPM symbol
because of the indexing defined earlier. To make a decision about the i-th bit, we need only
look at the outputs at the positions Aq(xi+1:q). Since the common randomness of lower





























Since the channel is memoryless, once the decoder select the 2i positions indexed by
Aq(xi+1:q), the distribution is independent of inputs to the higher levels and we can repre-
sent the above channel as in (4.6).
Since the i-th level channel is constant, we know that its capacity is fixed, and we can
characterize it more precisely as follows.
62






















Proof. The capacity of the i-th level is I(Xi; Ỹ |Xi+1:q) with Xj for j ∈ J1, qK distributed
uniformly in {0, 1}. Since Xi is independent of Xi+1:q, we have
I(Xi; Ỹ |Xi+1:q) = I(Xi; Ỹ , Xi+1:q) (4.10)
= I(X1:i; Ỹ , Xi+1:q)− I(X1:i−1; Ỹ , Xi:q) (4.11)
= I(X1:i; Ỹ |Xi+1:q)− I(X1:i−1; Ỹ |Xi:q). (4.12)
Similar to the argument used for deriving the equivalent channel of each level, we can show
that the quantityI(X1:i; Ỹ , Xi+1:q) is equivalent to I(X1:i; ỸAq(Xi+1:q)), which represents the
capacity of a PPM channel of order 2i. Using [44, Eq.(13)], we obtain









where P 2iPPM represents the output distribution when the input is uniform over all possible
PPM symbols of order 2i. Hence, we have

















Upper bounding the right-hand side using [44, Lemma 1] yields the desired result.
Note that, for higher levels, the capacity Ci goes to zero exponentially in the index of
the level. Since the sum of the capacities converges to D(P1‖P0) by [44, Lemma 2] and by
the capacity-achieving property of MLC with MSD [48], very few levels concentrate most
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of the capacity. As an example, Table 4.2 shows the capacity per level of first 16 levels for
a binary symmetric channel with cross-over probability 0.1. Notice that the first 5 levels
concentrate 93.4% of the total capacity.
Table 4.2: Capacity of first 16 levels for a BSC with cross-over probability 0.1
Level, i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Capacity, Ci 0.7421 0.6387 0.4918 0.3214 0.1749 0.0853 0.0413 0.0203
Level, i 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Capacity, Ci 0.0101 0.0050 0.0025 0.0013 0.0006 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001
We state some of the properties of equivalent channels in the following lemmas.
Lemma 7. The equivalent channel defined in (4.6) is symmetric.
Proof. The equivalent channel W i has the following property:
W i(y1, . . . , y2i |xi) = W i(y2i−1+1, . . . , y2i , y1, . . . , y2i−1|xi ⊕ 1). (4.15)
Therefore, the equivalent channel is symmetric.
Definition 1. Let Pi represent the set of all permutations of J1, 2iK. We define the set Πi as
Πi ,
{
σ ∈ Pi : ∀i ∈ J1, 2i−1K, σ(i) ∈ J1, 2i−1K
}
.
Let Π`i represent the set of permutations of a vector of length `, whose components are
vectors of length 2i, such that each component is permuted by one element of Πi.
Note that for π ∈ Π`i and ỹ ∈ Ỹ`i , π(ỹ) is a permutation of ỹ such that the components
of each ỹj ∈ Y2i are permuted in such a way that the components in the first half remain in
the first half.






























= W i(y1, . . . , y2i |xi), (4.18)
where (a) follows becauseAi(xi) is either J1, 2i−1K or J2i−1 + 1, 2iK depending on the value
of xi, and from the the definition of Πi, the summation has the same terms with and without
the permutation π. Therefore, W i is invariant under any permutation π ∈ Πi.
4.2 Analysis of MSD
We now prove that we can achieve reliability for the MLC scheme with MSD if we use
independent reliability codes for the equivalent channel corresponding to each level. Note
that the actual channel for each level is different from the equivalent channel defined in (4.6)
because of the use of codes for the lower levels instead of uniformly distributed inputs. Let
W i be the equivalent channel for level i as defined in (4.6). Let φi and ψi represent the
encoder and decoder for an (`,mi)-code for the i-th channel with rate Ri = mi` . We define





Encoding: The encoder partitions the message W with `R bits into q messages such that
the i-th message Wi contains `Ri bits. It then uses φi to encode Wi into an `-bit sequence
Xi = (Xi,1, · · · , Xi,`). Let Xi:q,j , (Xi,j, Xi+1,j, . . . , Xq,j). The PPM mapper maps X1:q,j
to x̃(X1:q,j) for j ∈ J1, `K as defined in (3.3) to form a sequence of ` PPM symbols, which
is transmitted over the channel.
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Decoding: Let Ỹ = (Ỹ1, · · · , Ỹ`) be the received sequence, where Ỹi = (Yi,1, . . . , Yi,m).
The decoder starts from the level q and decodes the messages successively from level q
to 1. To decode the i-th level, we assume that estimates of Wi+1, . . . ,Wq are available at
the decoder as Ŵi+1, · · · , Ŵq. The decoder also has the estimates of the inputs to these
decoded levels as X̂j , φ(Ŵj). It uses these estimates to form a sequence
ỸAq(X̂i+1:q) ,
(
Ỹ1,Aq(X̂i+1:q,1), . . . , Ỹ`,Aq(X̂i+1:q,`)
)
, (4.20)
where Ỹk,Aq(X̂i+1:q,k) , (Yk,t)t∈Aq(X̂i+1:q,k). The decoder estimates the message Wi as Ŵi ,
ψi(ỸAq(X̂i+1:q)). We define the decoding region of message wi for the decoder ψi as Dwi ,
{ỹ ∈ Ỹ`i : ψi(ỹ) = wi}.
Assumption: For ỹ = (ỹ1, . . . , ỹ`), where ỹj = (yj,1, . . . , yj,2i), and for any permutation
π ∈ Π`i , we assume that if ỹ ∈ Dwi , then π(ỹ) ∈ Dwi .
This assumption is reasonable because there exist efficient decoders such as the successive
cancellation decoder for polar codes that have this property.
Lemma 9. For the successive cancellation decoder of polar codes, ỹ ∈ Dwi =⇒ π(ỹ) ∈
Dwi for every π ∈ Π`i .
Proof. Assume ` is a power of two. Let ui,1:` = xi,1:`G`, where G` is the polar code trans-
form matrix defined in [46]. In successive decoding of polar codes, the decoder produces
the decision by computing
P
(

















(W i)⊗`(ỹ|xi)p(uj+1, . . . , uq). (4.22)
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From Lemma 8, we have
(W i)⊗` (π(ỹ)|xi) = (W i)⊗` (ỹ|xi) . (4.23)
Hence, P
(
Uj = uj|Ỹ = ỹ,U1:j−1 = û1:j−1
)
is also invariant under the permutation π and
the result follows.
Lemma 10. Suppose we have a code (φi, ψi) for the channel











with rate Ri and probability of error εi, such that ψi satisfies the above assumption on the
decoding region. We can then design a code for the MLC-PPM scheme with rate R =
∑q
i=1Ri and probability of error ε =
∑q
i=1 εi.
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
4.3 Analysis of covertness
We now turn our attention to the covertness properties of the MLC scheme. Instead of deal-








the distribution PZ̃ induced at the output of the PPM super-channel when coding over `
PPM symbols of order m, and the distribution (QmPPM)
⊗`, which is a product distribution
over the ` uses of the super channel, and QmPPM is the output induced by a uniform input
distribution on PPM symbols of order m. For j ∈ J1, qK, assume that the codebook at level
j consists of Mj codewords Ci = {c(ij)}Mjij=1. Upon denoting the super channel transition

























represents the distribution induced at Willie’s output when coding all levels
from j + 1 down to q and transmitting uniformly distributed bits on all lower levels. Note
that P (0)
Z̃
















































































































Notice that the two terms inside the absolute are distributions that only differ in that one
has a coded j-th level, while the other has an uncoded j-th level with uniform random bits.
Lemma 11. For every j ∈ J1, qK, consider the channel































6 δj irrespective of the code used for the











Proof. See Appendix 4.B
Lemma 11 may be viewed as the counterpart of Lemma 10 for resolvability instead of
reliability. Since the equivalent channel (4.28) is again invariant with the number of levels
q > i, we conclude that we can design channel resolvability codes for a fixed channel while
still growing the number of levels with the code length.
To conclude regarding the ability to achieve covertness with the multilevel scheme, we























































decays fast enough at each level and with ` scal-
ing as in [44], we may ensure covertness at a throughput close to the covert capacity.
4.4 Towards a concrete polynomial-complexity instantiation
The key observation to instantiate actual codes is that the problem reduces to constructing
codes for the equivalent channels identified in Lemma 10 and Lemma 11. If the original
channels are degraded, then the equivalent channels are also degraded as shown in Sec-
tion 3.3.6. Since the successive cancellation decoder of polar codes satisfies the assump-
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tion on the decoding regions that we used for the proof of reliability, polar codes would be
a suitable solution to achieve the covert capacity. In fact, we know from [39] how to de-
sign polar codes simultaneously for reliability and resolvability, with a negligible amount
of shared randomness and metrics (probability of error and variational distance) that decay
fast with the blocklength. Such constructions would carry over directly. One subtle point
is how to address coding for the higher and very noisy levels. In fact, achieving reliability
would be next to impossible at such low rates, and one would therefore not communicate
over these levels, and just achieve channel resolvability using bits of private randomness.
The top most levels have a rate that vanishes with the block length, and one concern is
whether polarization happens fast enough at these levels. Lemma 6 shows that the rate
decays exponentially with q and as the inverse of m. Polarization, however, only happens
at a rate 1
mγ
for some γ < 1, which will therefore force us to overestimate the number of
random bits to input. Fortunately, the number of levels is logarithmic in m, so that the rate
of private randomness remains negligible.
4.4.1 Coding scheme using polar codes
In the following theorem, we show that we can achieve the covert capacity of a BI-DMC
using polar codes.
Theorem 1. Fix positive constants ζ and δ. For n large enough, there exist low-complexity
polar coding schemes for each level of MLC-PPM scheme described in previous sec-




− ζ , with probability of error at most ζ , and
D(PZ‖Q⊗n0 ) 6 δ + ζ .











consider an MLC-PPM scheme with the number of levels q = log2m in which the trans-
mission occurs in blocks of ` PPM symbols of order m. Since Willie’s channel is degraded
w.r.t. Bob’s channel, for each level i ∈ J1, qK, the channel W i(z1, · · · , z2i|xi) defined in
(4.28) is also degraded w.r.t. the channel W i(y1, · · · , y2i |xi) defined in (4.6). Let QZ̃(i)
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represent the distribution induced at the output of W i(z1, · · · , z2i |xi) when the input to the
channel is uniformly distributed. Let
RYi , I(Xi; Ỹ |X i+1:q)−
A
`εκ




Then, for some β ∈]0, 1
2
[ and ε ∈]0, 1−2β[, by [42, Proposition 3, Lemma 1, and Lemma 2],
there exist constants κ,A, andC and low-complexity polar codes Ci for each level i ∈ J1, qK
with rate Ri , max(RYi , R
Z
i ) such that if `Ri bits are coded into a binary codeword of
length ` > 2C and transmitted over both W i(y1, · · · , y2i |xi) and W i(z1, · · · , z2i |xi), for
the distribution PZ̃(i) induced at the output of the channel W









`2−`β) and a probability of error upper-bounded by O(`2−`β).




i , we need
key with rate RZi −RYi .
If the decoder uses the successive cancellation decoder of polar codes, by Lemma 10,
the probability of error is upper bounded by O(q`2−`β), which is less than ζ for large









































































































































which is less than δ + ζ for large enough `.
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From Section 3.3.6, we know that for degraded case, I(Xi; Ỹ |X i+1:q) > I(Xi; Z̃|X i+1:q)
for all i ∈ J1, qK. Hence, the number of key bits required is


















Hence, this coding scheme achieves the covert capacity.
4.4.2 Coding scheme using invertible extractors
We can further reduce the complexity of the coding scheme using invertible extractors for
channel resolvability. Since the capacity of the higher levels goes to zero exponentially, we
can use the first few levels to code for reliability and only use the higher levels to achieve
channel resolvability. Let u represent the number of levels used to code for reliability. We
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can simplify the code construction by constructing a single code for all the higher levels. If
we take the levels from u + 1 to q as a single channel, the corresponding channel is given
by











This channel is symmetric in the sense that for all xu+1:q and x′u+1:q, there exists a permu-
tation of the components of z̃ denoted by πxu+1:q+x′u+1:q such that
W u+1:q(πxu+1:q+x′u+1:q(z̃)|xu+1:q) = W
u+1:q(z̃|x′u+1:q). (4.49)
We follow a construction of codes using invertible extractors similar to the ones used
in [50, 40]. Let Ext be a two-universal extractor defined as
Ext : S× F(q−u)`2 → F(q−u)`−k2 : (s, x) 7→ b,
and Inv be the inverter of Ext defined as
Inv : S× F(q−u)`−k2 × Fk2 → F(q−u)`2 : (s, b, r) 7→ xu+1:q.
Let Ps,b , {x ∈ F(q−u)`2 : Ext(s, x) = b}. We assume that Ext is regular, that is,
{Ps,b}b∈F(q−u)`−k2 forms a partition of F
(q−u)`
2 into bins of equal size. For a given s ∈ S
and b ∈ F(q−u)`−k2 , the encoder φ is given by
φ : Fk2 → F(q−u)`2 : r 7→ Inv(s, b, r).



























Lemma 12. The encoder φ defined above with rate Ru+1:q = k` with s and b selected










if Ru+1:q > I(Xu+1:q; Z̃) + 2εH(Z̃).
Proof. See Appendix 4.C.
We now employ a specific extractor. For s ∈ S = F(q−u)`2 \{0}, define
Ext : S× F(q−u)`2 → F(q−u)`−k2 : (s, x) 7→ b , (s−1  x)|J1,(q−u)`−kK, (4.54)
where is the multiplication in the field F(q−u)`2 and (·)|J1,(q−u)`−kK represents the bits in the
positions J1, (q − u)`K. Ext is a two-universal hash function [50], whose inverter is given
by
Inv : S× F(q−u)`−k2 × Fk2 → F(q−u)`2 : (s, b, r) 7→ s (b‖r), (4.55)
where (·‖·) denotes the concatenation of two sequences of bits. We now show that for the




































































































































































From the above, we conclude that the choice of b is irrelevant for achieving channel resolv-
ability. Hence, we can choose b = 0. Finally, note that we do not require S to be private, so
we can use publicly available common randomness as the source for S, and we can reduce
the rate of S by using a chaining strategy similar to the one in [40].
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APPENDIX
4.A Proof of Lemma 10
Let Ei , {Ŵi 6= Wi}. We can express the probability of error as follows:
P
(








































































































































































where (4.75) results from the assumption on the decoding region. In fact, each term inside
∑
k∈Ai(xi,j) can be obtained by permuting ỹj by one of the permutation defined earlier.
Since, all those permutations are included in the set {ỹ : ψi(ỹ) 6= wi}, the same product











































































































For the equivalent channel, the probability of error for a given input message is
P
(












































































which proves the lemma.
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4.B Proof of Lemma 11
The result follows from observations similar to those in the proof of Lemma 10 regarding
the symmetries of the PPM modulation. Specifically, consider level j. For all codewords
cj+1, · · · , cq used in the upper levels, we have











































































































































































































































































































where (a) follows from dividing the summation over z̃ into summation over components
z̃Aq(cj+1:q) defined as in (4.20) and its complementary components denoted by z̃Aq(cj+1:q)c .












which proves the lemma.
4.C Proof of Lemma 12
We define a typical set as follows:
T `ε (Xu+1:q, Z̃) ,
{




























































































































































(Xu+1:q, Z̃) /∈ T `ε (Xu+1:q, Z̃)
)
(4.105)









(a) follows from qB(b) = 12(q−u)`−k and from the definition of Ps,b.
(b) follows by Jensen’s inequality
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(c) follows because Ext is two-universal and hence, for all x̄u+1:q 6= xu+1:q, we have
PS(Ext(S, x̄u+1:q) = Ext(S,xu+1:q)) =
∑
s
qS(s)1 {Ext(s, x̄u+1:q) = Ext(s,xu+1:q)}
6 2−((q−u)`−k),








(e) follows from bounding the term inside log from the definition of the typical set and
using the definition µz = minz∈supp(QZ) QZ(z).
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CHAPTER 5
CODES FOR COVERT COMMUNICATION OVER ADDITIVE WHITE
GAUSSIAN CHANNELS
The information-theoretic analysis of covert communication for DMCs [16, 17] shows that
the optimal signaling should be sparse, in that the fraction of “non-innocent symbols” in a
codeword of length n should beO( 1√
n
). From Section 2.6, we know that binary linear codes
cannot achieve the covert capacity of BI-DMCs without shared secret key, which prompted
the exploration of non-linear coding schemes. The proposed solution has been to rely on
PPM, which was known to be optimal [44] with random non-binary code, and to circumvent
the design of non-binary codes using MLC. This scheme systematically introduces sparsity
in the inputs to the BI-DMC by coding over multiple levels and concentrating most of the
information on a few levels. Most importantly, under MSD, the channels perceived at each
level were shown to be stationary, thereby allowing the use of families of capacity- and
resolvability-achieving codes.
In contrast, the information-theoretic analysis of covert communication for AWGN
channels [16] shows that the optimal signaling should be diffuse, in that the covert ca-
pacity is achieved using Gaussian random codebooks whose variance scales with code-
word length n as O( 1√
n
). The covert capacity can also be achieved with binary phase-shift
keying (BPSK)-modulation using appropriately scaled amplitude [51]. Unfortunately, this
seemingly does not allow the application of the MLC-PPM scheme developed for DMCs.
We, therefore, investigate the effectiveness of sparse modulation schemes for covert com-
munication over AWGN channels and extend the MLC-PPM scheme to develop a low-
complexity scheme. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 5.1, we
introduce the exact problem setup. In Section 5.2, we study sparse modulation schemes
for covert communication over AWGN channels, and in Section 5.3, we analyze a bi-
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orthogonal PPM scheme [52] with two non-zero symbols for the “on” position. We briefly
discuss the MLC-PPM scheme in Section 5.4.
5.1 Covert communication over AWGN channels
We consider a scenario in which a transmitter (Alice) communicates over an AWGN chan-
nel with transition probability WY |X with a legitimate receiver (Bob) while avoiding de-
tection from a warden (Willie) who observes Alice’s transmission through another AWGN
channel with transition probability WZ|X . The two channels are described by
Y = X +Nb, Z = X +Nw, (5.1)
whereNb andNw have zero-mean Gaussian distributions with variances σ2b and σ
2
w, respec-
tively. The innocent input in the absence of communication is X = 0 and we denote the
distributions WY |X=0 and WZ|X=0 by P0 and Q0, respectively.
Alice encodes a message W uniformly drawn from a message set M to a codeword
Xn of n real-valued symbols, which are observed by Bob and Willie as outputs of their
channels Y n and Zn, respectively. Bob’s estimate of the transmitted message is denoted
by Ŵ . Let QnZ be the distribution induced by the coding scheme and Q
⊗n
0 be the innocent
distribution induced by the all zero input. A code achieves covert throughput R with a














D(QnZ‖Q⊗n0 ) 6 δ, (5.2)
where D(·‖·) denotes the relative entropy between the distributions. The supremum of all
achievable covert throughputs is called the covert capacity and denoted by L. For the case
in which σb = σw = σ, the analysis in [16] shows that L = 1 nats. In our case, a similar
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5.2 Sparse Modulation for Covert Communication
The analysis in [16] shows that the covert capacity of AWGN channels may be achieved
with a Gaussian random code in which codewords are generated independent and identi-
cally distributed (i.i.d.) according to N (0, ρn) with ρn , 2σ2w
√
δ/n. A refined analysis
shows that random coding with uniformly distributed BPSK symbols and amplitude scal-
ing as O(n−1/4) also achieves the covert capacity [51]. Unfortunately, such scaling results
in a diffuse modulation for which coding schemes are challenging to design. The MLC-
PPM scheme developed in the previous chapters for BI-DMC provides a method that uses
independent codes over multiple levels and concentrates the communication rate on a few
levels. The crucial component of that scheme is the use of PPM, a sparse modulation
scheme. Motivated by the success of sparse modulation for code design, we study the
effectiveness of sparse modulation over AWGN channels.
5.2.1 Sparse On-Off keying (OOK)
In an OOK scheme, one only uses two symbols as inputs to the channel: an “off” input 0
and an “on” input a. The input distribution on {0, a} is denoted by Παn with Παn(a) =
1− Παn(0) = αn. The corresponding output distributions for Bob’s and Willie’s channels
are PY and QZ , respectively. We define P+a , WY |X=a, Q+a , WZ|X=a, and
PY (y) , (1− αn)P0(y) + αnP+a(y), (5.3)
QZ(z) , (1− αn)Q0(z) + αnQ+a(z). (5.4)
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By an analysis similar to [17], we can show that the mutual information between X and
Y for the above distribution is









































One can also show that the relative entropy between distributions QZ and Q0 can be

















From the proof of [16, Theorem 5], the maximum covert throughput possible by re-
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From (5.12), for D(QZ‖Q0) to approach zero as n tends to infinity, we need αn to tend to















From (5.9) and (5.11), we have
































for a ≈ ±1.26σw, from which
we conclude that coding over OOK cannot approach the covert capacity of AWGN chan-
nels.
5.2.2 Modified sparse OOK
We now show that by modifying the sparse OOK modulation scheme to allow both−a and
+a symbols in the alphabet, we can achieve covert throughputs close to covert capacity. In
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this modified OOK scheme, we use {0,−a,+a} as the input alphabet with input distribu-
tion Παn such that Παn(−a) = Παn(+a) = αn2 and Παn(0) = 1−αn. In this case, we have
the output distributions PY and PZ as follows:
P−a , WY |X=−a, P+a , WY |X=+a, (5.18)








PY (y) , (1− αn)P0(y) + αnP±a(y), (5.21)
QZ(z) , (1− αn)Q0(z) + αnQ±a(z). (5.22)




(D(P−a‖P0) + D(P+a‖P0))− D(PY ‖P0) (5.23)
and








































































































































(−(z + (k − 2`)a)2
2σ2w
+



















Substituting the above equation in (5.28), we obtain (5.26).
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= δ(k − 3). (5.51)


























For a codebook of |M| codewords, each of length n generated i.i.d. with distribution Παn ,
we have








D(QnZ‖Q⊗n0 ) = nD(QZ‖Q0). (5.54)





(Q±a‖Q0) for a given δ > 0, we obtain




































This shows that we can achieve a covert throughput close to the optimal throughput by
choosing a small enough and αn as above. This results in a sparse modulation, which
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allows us to implement an MLC-PPM scheme.







)1/4, we have from (5.52),







This corresponds to a diffuse modulation scheme with uniformly distributed BPSK symbols
that we mentioned in the beginning of this section [51].
5.3 Bi-orthogonal PPM for AWGN channel
In the spirit of [44] for DMCs, we now show how to replace the modified OOK scheme with
a bi-orthogonal PPM to achieve the optimal throughput. We define the bi-orthogonal PPM
alphabet of order m as X̃ = {x̃i,j}i∈J1,mK,j∈{0,1}, where x̃i,j is vector of length m whose
i-th element is (−1)ja and all other elements are 0. By selecting symbols uniformly from
X̃ and transmitting them through m independent uses of the channels WY |X and WZ|X ,
denoted by the PPM super channels W̃Ỹ |X̃ and W̃Z̃|X̃ , we obtain the output distributions
PỸ and QZ̃ , respectively. Let X̃ represent the input random variable uniformly distributed
on X̃ and Ỹ and Z̃ represent the corresponding output random variables.
The mutual information between X̃ and Ỹ is given by















W ⊗mY |X(Ỹ |X̃)










































































The relative entropy between QZ̃ and Q
⊗m






























































































































































































































































































By an argument similar to the modified OOK case, one can show by random coding over
` = d 2δ
χ
2
(Q±a||Q0)me super channel uses that this scheme achieves the covert capacity.
5.4 Multilevel coding scheme for AWGN channels
In this section, we provide an overview of the MLC-PPM coding scheme for covert com-



























Figure 5.1: Setup for MLC-PPM scheme for AWGN channels.
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channel is degraded w.r.t. Bob’s channel, and that q = log2m is an integer, where m is
the order of the bi-orthogonal PPM symbol. The MLC coding scheme is similar to the one
introduced in Chapter 3 for DMC but requires q+1 levels to account for the choice between
−a and a at the position of non-zero symbol. As shown in Fig. 5.1, the input to i-th level
for i ∈ J0, qK by Wi, with level 0 coding for the sign of the non-zero in the PPM symbol.
The encoder for the i-th level selects the codeword indexed by Wi from the codebook Ci as
the input Xi to the PPM mapper. The PPM mapper maps the inputs X0:q to x̃(X0:q), where
the mapping x̃ : Fq+12 → X̃q is given by
x̃(x0:q) = x̃Aq(x1:q),x0 = x̃d(x1:q),x0 , (5.78)
where d(x1:q) and Aq(xS) are as defined in Section 3.1.
We decompose the mutual information between the input and the output as
I(X̃; Ỹ ) = I(X0:q; Ỹ ) =
q∑
i=0
I(Xi; Ỹ |Xi+1:q). (5.79)
As identified in Section 3.3.4, this decomposition suggests an operating point for MLC for
which the rate of each level is given by




We also define the equivalent channel corresponding to each level as follows. The equiva-
lent channel for 0-th level is
W 0(y|x0) = P(−1)x0a(y), (5.81)
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and the equivalent channel for i-th level for i ∈ J1, qK is
























Lemma 14. For i ∈ J0, qK, suppose (φi, ψi) is an encoder/decoder for the stationary chan-
nelW i defined in (5.81)-(5.83) with rateRi and probability of error εi, such that ψi satisfies
the mild assumption on the decoding region defined in Section 4.1. Then, the overall MLC-
PPM scheme has rate R =
∑q
i=0Ri and probability of error ε =
∑q
i=0 εi.
Proof. The proof follows steps similar to those of Lemma 10, adapted to continuous output
alphabets.







, where PZ̃ denotes the distri-
bution induced at the output of the PPM super-channel when coding over ` PPM symbols
of order m, QmPPM denotes the output distribution induced by a uniform input distribution
on PPM symbols of order m, and (QmPPM)
⊗` denotes product distribution over the ` uses
of the super channel. For i ∈ J0, qK, assume that the codebook for level i consists of Mi






















W̃ ⊗` (z̃|x0, . . . ,xi−1, ci, . . . , cq) . (5.84)
Note that P (0)
Z̃











































































































W̃ ⊗` (z̃|x0, . . . ,xi−1,xi, ci+1, . . . , cq)
)∣∣∣∣∣ (5.87)
Then, the following holds for resolvability.
Lemma 15. Consider the stationary channels
W 0(z|x0) = Q(−1)x0a(z), (5.88)







0 (z1, . . . , z2i)
× Q±a(zk)
Q0(zk)
for i ∈ J1, qK. (5.89)
For i ∈ J0, qK, let PZ̃(i) denote the output distribution induced by a code over this chan-
nel, and let Q⊗`
Z̃(i)
















6 δi irrespective of











Proof. The proof follows steps similar to those of Lemma 11, adapted to the continuous
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output alphabets.
Consequently, one can implement codes at each level such as those outlined in [53].
Moreover, as shown in Section 4.1, most of the information concentrates in the lower levels
implying an efficient design by using higher levels just for resolvability.
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CHAPTER 6
FORWARD RECONCILIATION FOR COVERT KEY GENERATION
Information reconciliation is an important step in the secret key generation. In secret key
generation problem, we consider two legitimate users and one adversary. The objective
of the legitimate users is to generate a secret key from their correlated observations and
the public information exchanged between them. In the first step, both users agree on a
common sequence by exchanging messages over a public channel. This step is known
as the information reconciliation step. Then, they generate the secret key by applying a
publicly agreed deterministic function on that common sequence. There are mainly two
kinds of secret key generation models: source model and channel model. In the source
model, two legitimate users and the adversary observe three correlated sequences. In the
channel model, one of the legitimate users generate a sequence and the other user and the
adversary observes the output of their respective channels. By restricting the exchange of
public messages in the channel model problem to only one direction, we can classify the
reconciliation protocol to two types: forward reconciliation in which the public messages
are allowed only in the direction of channel and reverse reconciliation in which the public
messages are allowed only in the reverse direction.
Along with the development in the classical covert communication, there have been
several efforts to extend the ideas of covert communication to the quantum regime [54, 29,
55] and in particular to quantum key distribution [28, 56]. The most recent efforts in this
direction have clarified the role of public communication, and clearly defined how infor-
mation reconciliation impacts covertness for key generation over quantum channels [57].
While the introduction of covert constraints does not change the high-level principle of
reconciliation [58], a subtle requirement is that the reconciliation message should remain
independent of the eavesdropper’s observations. While this does not pose any particular
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difficulty from an information-theoretic perspective, this complicates the design of actual
codes.
The objective of this chapter is to offer an initial low-complexity solution to the prob-
lem of forward reconciliation for covert key generation. The ideas are largely building on
previous work by exploiting MLC and PPM, but reconciliation introduces specific sub-
tleties that need to be properly addressed. For ease of exposition, the adversary is assumed
classical but the results generalize to quantum adversaries.
6.1 Covert forward-reconciliation
We analyze covert forward-reconciliation for the channel model illustrated in Figure 6.1.
Alice generates a sequence X of length n using a distribution QX under her control. Bob
and Willie observe the sequence through BI-DMCs (X ,WY |X ,Y) and (X ,WZ|X ,Z), re-
spectively, which we assume are such that H(X|Z) > H(X|Y ) to support key generation.
Let Y and Z represent Bob’s and Willie’s observations, respectively, corresponding to Al-
ice’s sequence X. Let M ∈M represent the message generated by Alice from X, which is
sent to Bob through a public channel. Let PMXYZ denote the joint distribution induced by
the coding scheme and qM denote the uniform distribution onM. The objective of covert
reconciliation is to generate the same sequence at Alice’s and Bob’s terminals while avoid-
ing detection by the warden Willie. We say that a covert forward-reconciliation throughput











































D(PMZ‖qMQ⊗n0 ) 6 δ. (6.3)
The supremum of all achievable throughputs is called the covert forward-reconciliation
capacity. We refer the reader to [57] for a full discussion of the framework for covert key
generation. The main benefit of focusing on reconciliation capacity is to delay secrecy
considerations at a later stage of the protocol and analysis.
6.2 MLC-PPM for covert forward reconciliation
We now describe the construction of codes for covert forward-reconciliation using MLC
and PPM, which is illustrated in Figure 6.1 and is similar to the setup in Chapter 3 for covert
communication. Alice generates q binary sequences {Xi}i∈J1,qK, each of length `, according
to a uniform distribution. We denote the j-th component of Xi by Xi,j . The q sequences
together can be thought of as a two-dimensional array X with i-th row Xi = Xi,1:` and j-th
column X1:q,j . Each row is fed to an encoder and the PPM mapper as shown in Figure 3.1.



































Figure 6.1: MLC-PPM setup for covert forward-reconciliation.
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Xi. Here, Mi is the message that Alice has to send to Bob to reconstruct the reconciliation
sequence and Ki is the secret key that can be extracted on both Alice’s and Bob’s end. The
PPM mapper of order q maps X1:q,i to X̃i = x̃(X1:q,i) to get the PPM sequence X̃ of length
`, which is observed by Bob and Willie at the output of their respective channels. Note that
the j-th component of X̃ represented by X̃j is a vector of length m = 2q. We denote the
output of the super channels corresponding to X̃ by Ỹ and Z̃. Similar to X̃, Ỹ and Z̃ are
sequences of length ` with each component of length m corresponding to one use of the
super channel. The j-th component of Ỹ (similarly Z̃) is denoted by Ỹj = (Ỹj,1, . . . , Ỹj,m).
We propose a block encoding scheme in which the keys extracted in one block is used
in the next block to achieve covertness requirement for the public message. We denote the
random variables associated with j-th block with a superscript as shown in the functional
dependence graph for the scheme in Figure 6.1.
6.3 High-level analysis of MLC-PPM for covert forward reconciliation
We now provide a high-level analysis of the block coding scheme. Let QX̃ỸZ̃ represent
the distribution induced by a uniform distribution on the PPM symbols at the input of the
channel. In the covert reconciliation scheme, as illustrated in Figure 3.1 for one block,
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Figure 6.1: Functional dependence graph of the proposed block encoding scheme.
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ing algorithm based on polar codes in the next section. The joint distribution of message
M
(1:B)
1:q and Willie’s output Z̃


























































































































































where (a) follows because M(j+1:B)1:q Z̃
(j+1:B) depends on M(j)1:qZ̃
(j) only through K̃(j)1:q as
shown in the functional dependence graph in Fig. 6.1.
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Note that QZ̃(j) is the distribution induced at the output of Willie’s super channel by an























so that this term vanishes for an appropriate choice of ` and m.
In the next section, we will analyze the other two terms for a specific coding scheme
based on polar codes. Most importantly, we now show that we can achieve the require-
ments of covert forward-reconciliation by coding for each level independently. As noted
in Section 4.1, given that the higher levels Xi+1:q are already decoded correctly, ỸAq(Xi+1:q)
is a sufficient statistic for decoding lower levels. Hence, we can represent the channel cor-
responding to each level by an equivalent channel when we use MSD at the receiver. The
equivalent channel corresponding to i-th level for Bob’s channel is given by
WỸAq(Xi+1:q)|Xi





































































The following lemma shows that we can achieve covertness condition by using a code that
achieve covertness for the equivalent channel corresponding to each level.
Lemma 16. For every i ∈ J1, qK, consider the channel
WZ̃Aq(Xi+1:q)|Xi












denote the joint distribution induced by a code over this channel, and let
qMiQZ̃Aq(Xi+1:q)
denote the distribution in which the messages are uniformly distributed and















6 δj irrespective of the coding
scheme used for the higher levels. Moreover, for the output of the super channel W̃Z̃|X1:q ,




























































































































































































is same for all realiza-
tions of Xi+1:q and M1:q\i.
We can also show that the term on the right hand side of (6.11) can be ensured to be
110
small by using codes that achieve a similar condition for the equivalent channel, which is
summarized in the following lemma.






δi for the equivalent channel in (6.18) for each i ∈ J1, qK, then the overall coding scheme
















































































where (a) follows because uniform distribution is the one that maximizes the entropy and






















, (c) follows from noting that
I(MiK̃i; Mi+1:qK̃i+1:qZ̃) 6 I(MiK̃i; Mi+1:qK̃i+1:qXi+1:qZ̃)
and I(MiK̃i; Mi+1:qK̃i+1:q|Xi+1:qZ̃) = 0, and (d) follows because given the realizations
of Xi+1:q, knowledge of Z̃Aq(Xi+1:q) is enough for the decoding of Mi and K̃i.
Similarly, the reliability condition is achieved by using a code that achieves reliability
for the equivalent channel corresponding to each level.
Lemma 18. Suppose we have an encoder φi that encodes a message Mi = φi(Xi) and a
decoder that reconstructs Xi as X̂i = ψi(Mi, Ỹ) from the message Mi and the output of
the channel
WỸAq(Xi+1:q)|Xi















6 εi, then there exists an encoder-decoder pair for the MLC-PPM







The proof of this lemma is similar to the proof of Lemma 10. For understanding the
difference in the proofs, we include it here.
Proof. Let Ei , {X̂i 6= Xi}. We can expand the probability of error as
P
(




































X̂i = xi|Xi = xi, X̂i+1 = Xi+1 = xi+1, . . . , X̂q = Xq = xq
)
(6.38)
We now analyze the conditional probability term in the above summation as follows.
P
(













P(Mi = mi|Xi = xi)P
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The probability of error for the reconstruction of source using the output of the equivalent


























































In the next section, we provide an instantiation of a coding scheme based on source
polarization.
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6.4 Polar code for covert forward reconciliation
We now describe a coding scheme for covert forward-reconciliation based on polar codes.
Let the input to the i-th level be Xi. Let the polar transform of Xi be Ui , G`Xi, where
G` is the source polarization transformation defined in [59]. For the equivalent channels
WỸAq(Xi+1:q)|Xi
and WZ̃Aq(Xi+1:q)|Xi
, we define the following sets:
HXi|Ỹ , {k ∈ J1, `K : H(Ui,k|Ui,1:k−1ỸAq(Xi+1:q)) > δ`} (6.51)
VXi|Z̃ , {k ∈ J1, `K : H(Ui,k|Ui,1:k−1Z̃Aq(Xi+1:q)) > 1− δ`}, (6.52)
where δ` , 2−`
β for 0 < β < 1/2.
From the definition of the equivalent channel, the memoryless nature of the channels,
and the fact that the polarization transform is invertible, we have the Markov chain Ui,k −
(Ui,1:k−1, ỸAq(Xi+1:q))− (Ui+1:q, Ỹ\ỸAq(Xi+1:q)). Hence,
H(Ui,k|Ui,1:k−1ỸAq(Xi+1:q)) = H(Ui,k|Ui,1:k−1Ui+1:qỸ). (6.53)
Algorithm 1: Alice’s encoding
Require K̃(0)1:q
for Block j = 1 to k do





































Alice’s algorithm for extracting messages and keys from the generated sequence is
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given in Algorithm 1. The encoding scheme requires a key K̃(0)1:q for the first block to
ensure covertness. For the subsequent blocks, Alice and Bob use a subsetAXY Z of the keys
extracted in the previous block. Bob reconstructs Alice’s sequence from his observations,
the received messages, and the shared secret key as given in Algorithm 2. Note that the
public message is split between Fi and F̃i to distinguish the bits that polarization makes
nearly uniform from those it does not.
Algorithm 2: Bob’s decoding
Require K̃(0)1:q
for Block j = 1 to k do
for Level i = q to 1 do


























6.4.1 Existence of polarized sets































|HXi|Ỹ \VXi|Z̃ |. (6.55)
Using the observation that |VXi|Z̃\HXi|Ỹ | − |HXi|Ỹ \VXi|Z̃ | = |VXi|Z̃ | − |HXi|Ỹ |, we have




|VXi|Z̃ | − |HXi|Ỹ |
)
. (6.56)
Hence, by an analysis similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 1, we get
lim
n→∞
|K(j−1)1:q | − |K(j)1:q|
`
= H(X1:q|Z̃)−H(X1:q|Ỹ ). (6.57)
Therefore, we can use a part of the extracted key K(j−1)1:q in the j-th block.
6.4.2 Reliability
































We prove the covertness of the polar coding scheme described in Algorithm 1 using the
following lemmas.
Lemma 19. For every block j ∈ J1, BK, the keys K̃(j)1:q and the public messages M(j)1:q
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1:q ⊕ K̃(j)1:q; K̃(j)1:q|F(j)1:q, Z̃(j)) (6.63)



















6 |K̃(j)1:q|+ |K(j)1:q| −H(K̃(j)1:q,K(j)1:q,F(j)1:q|Z̃(j)) +H(F(j)1:q|Z̃(j)) (6.66)













































































|VXi|Z̃ |δ` 6 q`δ` (6.75)
We bound the second term in (6.63) as follows:
I(F̃
(j)
1:q ⊕ K̃(j)1:q; K̃(j)1:q|F(j)1:q, Z̃(j)) 6 I(F̃(j)1:q ⊕ K̃(j)1:q; K̃(j)1:q,F(j)1:q, F̃(j)1:q, Z̃(j)) (6.76)
= H(F̃
(j)
1:q ⊕ K̃(j)1:q)−H(F̃(j)1:q ⊕ K̃(j)1:q|K̃(j)1:q,F(j)1:q, F̃(j)1:q, Z̃(j)) (6.77)
= H(F̃
(j)
1:q ⊕ K̃(j)1:q)−H(K̃(j)1:q|K̃(j)1:q,F(j)1:q, F̃(j)1:q, Z̃(j)) (6.78)
= H(F̃
(j)
1:q ⊕ K̃(j)1:q)−H(K̃(j)1:q) (6.79)
6 |K̃(j)1:q| −H(K̃(j)1:q) (6.80)
6 |K(j)1:q|+ |K̃(j)1:q| −H(K(j)1:q, K̃(j)1:q) (6.81)









i+1:q[VXi+1:q |Z̃\HXi+1:q |Ỹ ]) (6.83)





i [VXi|Z̃\HXi|Ỹ ]) (6.84)













6 |K(j)1:q|+ |K̃(j)1:q| −
q∑
i=1





δ` 6 q`δ` (6.87)
where (6.81) is because |K(j)1:q| > H(K(j)1:q|K̃(j)1:q).
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1:q) 6 2q`δ`. (6.88)
Lemma 20. For every block j ∈ J1, BK, the joint distribution of the public messages M(j)1:q























































= |M(j)1:q| −H(M(j)1:q|Z̃(j)) (6.92)
= |M(j)1:q| −H(F(j)1:q, F̃(j)1:q ⊕ K̃(j−1)1:q |Z̃(j)) (6.93)
= |M(j)1:q| −H(F(j)1:q|Z̃(j))−H(F̃(j)1:q ⊕ K̃(j−1)1:q |F(j)1:q, Z̃(j)) (6.94)
6 |M(j)1:q| − |F(j)1:q|(1− δ`)−H(F̃(j)1:q ⊕ K̃(j−1)1:q |F(j)1:q, Z̃(j)) (6.95)
= |M(j)1:q| − |F(j)1:q|(1− δ`)−H(F̃(j)1:q ⊕ K̃(j−1)1:q ) + I(F̃(j)1:q ⊕ K̃(j−1)1:q ; F(j)1:q, Z̃(j)) (6.96)
6 |M(j)1:q| − |F(j)1:q|(1− δ`)−H(F̃(j)1:q ⊕ K̃(j−1)1:q ) + I(F̃(j)1:q ⊕ K̃(j−1)1:q ; F̃(j)1:q) (6.97)
= |M(j)1:q| − |F(j)1:q|(1− δ`)−H(F̃(j)1:q ⊕ K̃(j−1)1:q |F̃(j)1:q) (6.98)
= |M(j)1:q| − |F(j)1:q|(1− δ`)−H(K̃(j−1)1:q ) (6.99)








where (6.97) is because of the Markov chain (F(j)1:q, Z̃
(j))− F̃(j)1:q − F̃(j)1:q ⊕ K̃(j−1)1:q .
























For ` and m large enough and B and m, the term B`χ2(Q1||Q0)
2m
dominates over the other


















The reconciliation algorithm presented here agrees on the sequence X1:B1:q in Bm` channel






Since X1:B1:q has i.i.d. uniform distribution, H(X
1:B
1:q ) = B`H(X1:q) = B`H(X̃).
H(M
(1:B)















































which one can show is optimal.





























With increasing concerns over the privacy and security of communication technologies,
covert communication proposes a way to hide sensitive communication. The last decade
witnessed significant contributions in the information-theoretic analysis of covert commu-
nication, including the limits of covert communication for point-to-point and multiuser
scenarios. However, the research on the development of codes for covert communication
lagged behind the information-theoretic analysis. In this work, we tried to bridge this gap
by showing the existence of practical coding schemes for covert communication.
One of the main hurdles in the development of covert communication is the requirement
for a coding scheme with a low rate that arises because of the square root law. The square
root law of covert communication states that we can transmit onlyO(√n) bits in n channel
uses by avoiding detection by an adversary. This suggests that we need to induce a heavily
biased input distribution. One way to achieve this is by mapping a sequence of symbols
with the required bias to a “super-symbol”, and then coding over those super-symbols. In
this regard, the optimality of PPM as a super-symbol was shown in [44]. However, a coding
scheme over the PPM symbol requires non-binary codes with the alphabet size scaling with
the length of the codeword, making it difficult to analyze. We overcame this with the use
of MLC with PPM.
In the MLC-PPM scheme, the “super-channel” with non-binary input is transformed
into multiple channels with binary input. Although the number of levels scales with the
blocklength, we have shown that most of the capacity concentrates on the first few levels
and the equivalent channel corresponding to each existing level remains the same when we
increase the number of levels. Furthermore, we have shown that one can independently
design codes for each level by constructing codes for the equivalent channels, which in
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turn achieve overall reliability and channel resolvability under mild assumptions regarding
some symmetry conditions on the decoder. In particular, one may use polar codes because
the successive cancellation decoder for polar codes satisfies the symmetry requirement.
Finally, since the first few levels concentrate most of the capacity, one may code a limited
number of levels for reliability and only code the remaining levels for resolvability using a
negligible number of key bits. We have also shown how to code for channel resolvability
on all of those remaining levels at once using invertible extractors, further reducing the
complexity of the design.
While the discussion has focused on binary-input DMCs, the proposed coding scheme
achieves reliability and covertness over any DMC, but without reaching the covert capacity
in general. Extending the coding scheme to achieve the covert capacity is certainly possible,
for instance by allowing more than a single non-innocent symbol in the PPM scheme. This
is demonstrated in the extension of the MLC-PPM scheme using bi-orthogonal PPM sym-
bols for covert communication over additive white Gaussian channels. While the practical
application of this scheme for covert communication may not be possible in the imme-
diate future, our illustration of this scheme for covert forward-reconciliation could find a
potential application for quantum key distribution.
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